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PREFACE
On 14 October 2014, IRGC together with the OECD Regulatory Policy Division 
organised a conference on Improving Risk Regulation 1. Confronted with the 
challenge of improving regulatory performance, many governments in the 
world are looking for ways to better manage risks, in particular those risks 
that develop in complex systems, with stakeholders from various sectors, 
and that are marked by uncertainty. The conference discussed in particular:
• Private regulation 
• Role of non-governmental actors in regulating risk 
• Contributions from behavioural economics and sciences
• Enhancing adaptability and flexibility in pharmaceuticals regulation
Regulation is one of the options for governing risks. With this publication, 
IRGC’s intention is to explore certain developments that may contribute to 
improving risk governance by governments, in partnership with others. 
IRGC wishes to thank the following contributors and reviewers, whose critical 
comments have helped improve the content and quality of the papers: Wandi 
Bruine de Bruin, Gérard Escher, John Graham, Granger Morgan, Faisal Naru, 
Arthur Petersen, Andrea Renda, Ortwin Renn and Jonathan Wiener. 
In its public conference on Adaptive Risk Regulation, jointly organised with the 
Department of Science, Technology and Public Policy at University College 
London, on 7-8 January 2016, IRGC will continue to explore and discuss 
the concept and application of planned adaptive risk regulation in various 
sectors 2.
1 irgc.org/event/annual-conference-2014-summary 
2 irgc.org/event/planning-adaptive-risk-regulation
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INTRODUCTION
1. Setting the context: contemporary risk regulation
Designing and implementing public interventions to effectively understand, 
prevent or mitigate risks has never been straightforward. In contemporary 
governance, nonetheless, public risk management activities appear to be 
particularly challenged. Because of the prevalence of systemic risks that span 
across sectors, actors and countries, and of societal expectation to manage 
emerging risks, risk assessment, management and communication are being 
questioned. Established approaches to understanding and addressing risks 
with impact on the environment, the economy or society may no longer be 
effective or fully legitimised. Also a major instrument that Western society has 
adopted to address risks – regulatory interventions – is under the spotlight 
and its performance and cost-effectiveness is sometimes challenged.
Traditional regulatory risk management – its nature, scope and efficiency 
– is being tested against changed framework conditions, which emerged 
because of the concomitance of a number of new global phenomena.
• Multiple, multiplying and interdependent linkages – Globalisation is not a 
mere keyword. The 21st century world is characterised by faster interactions 
between various actors across levels of established governance. Wiener 
(2011) describes three dimensions of increasing interconnectedness 
and risk regulation: (i) the faster and wider propagation of risks across 
globalising networks (for instance the transmission of pandemic disease, 
financial crises, terrorist attacks, or cyberwar); (ii) so-called “multi-risk 
impacts” generated by any intervention to address one risk, including 
ancillary harms and benefits (because the world is a web of multiple 
interconnected risks); and (iii) the increasing diffusion of regulatory ideas 
and learning across regulatory systems, potentially helping to address 
the first two dimensions. Well-defined and contained territorial and 
jurisdictional units of governance are no longer the reference system. 
No single, clearly identifiable and legitimated (public) actor can address 
complex societal problems. Globalisation has brought unprecedented 
opportunities for both developed countries and emerging economies but it 
requires a reorganisation of actions at the local, national and international 
level, as well as across various types of public and private organisations 
(Nye and Donahue, 2000; Vogel and Kagan, 2004; Camilleri and Falk, 2009).
by Lorenzo Allio 1
1 European Risk Forum and allio|rodrigoconsulting.
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• Greater complexity and salience – Regulators are called upon to tackle 
increasingly complex and multi-faceted challenges. If in the past problems 
have tended to be tackled singularly as definite entities, today we recognise 
the presence of – and expect solutions to – risks that cover the widest 
possible spectrum of the observable (Power, 2004). Action expected 
from public risk managers ranges from overarching societal problems 
(such as climate change and population ageing) to specific exposures 
to single chemicals (e.g. an endocrine disruptor) and the use of novel 
technologies or processes (for instance, nano- and bio-technologies). 
Regulators are moreover called upon to manage proven or potential risks 
which may involve fundamental ethical issues (e.g. application of stem 
cells research) or pertain to life-style (determined by individual nutritional, 
smoking or alcohol consumption patterns), which stretch the boundaries 
of the role of the state (Asveld and Roeser, 2009; Alemanno and Garde, 
2013). Furthermore, emerging risks are constantly brought onto the 
regulators’ radar screen (IRGC, 2015). To a greater extent than in the past, 
risk regulators are now asked not only to react but also to anticipate future 
risks, deploying diversified rational risk management strategies (Viscusi, 
1998; Sunstein, 2002; Hutter, 2010). Finally, the management of systemic 
risks is also increasingly relevant and in demand – both from the point 
of view of controlling catastrophic events and system-disruptive threats 
and as a means, by clustering various (types of) risks, to find suitable 
approaches to manage an economic and social system (OECD, 2003; 
Helbing, 2010; Alemanno, 2011).
• Evolving processes and tools – Evolving governance modifies decisional 
processes. The pivotal actor for public risk management is no longer only 
the ‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1996). Increasingly, the goals and standards 
set out in primary legislation are interpreted and implemented through 
rule-making by non-state actors as well as administrative decisions 
or adjudication (Craig, 1990; Fisher, 2007). An “administrative state” 
has emerged in which the executive frequently acts as the regulator, 
the administrator and the arbiter, sometimes confusing the traditional 
separation of powers designed to protect citizens from poor quality or 
arbitrary decision-making (Richardson, 2002). So-called ‘Better Regulation’ 
principles and practices have been widely diffused internationally (OECD, 
2015),2 but their application has yet to fully reflect this development. The 
development and adoption of substantive guidance, for instance, tends 
to escape process management standards.3 Against this background, 
moreover, new tools for interpreting and managing risk situations are 
being tested. Insights from behavioural sciences have for instance opened 
new possible avenues to design and organise public risk management 
interventions using cues or ‘nudges’ (Shafir, 2013; Lunn, 2014) or deploying 
2 The diffusion of regulatory impact assessment – initially ex ante and nowadays increasingly ex post as well – is a point in case 
(DeFrancesco, 2013; Wiener, 2013).
3 A form of “soft law”, substantive guidance is used to set out detailed technical, scientific, or procedural requirements that must 
be met to fulfil obligations laid down in legally binding acts and to provide detailed interpretations of statutory obligations thereby 
defining requirements or impacts for affected entities. In many sectors, and for a wide range of risks, substantive guidance is one 
of the most important means used to implement secondary legislation. It is used to define, for instance, the technical or scientific 
requirements that businesses must meet if their products, processes, materials, or services are to satisfy standards of safety 
or quality or efficacy or environmental impact. Substantive guidance may also define complex hazards or clarify the scope and 
impact of major risk management laws (European Risk Forum, forthcoming; Graham and Broughel, 2014).
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more experimental approaches such as design thinking and prototyping 
(Brown, 2009; Bason, 2010; Allio, 2014). Accountability, predictability, the 
rule of law and the quality of decision-making – and even its very legitimacy 
– may suffer when public and private decision-makers are dis-jointed from 
those affected by their decisions.
• Higher expectations and weaker confidence – Trust and confidence in 
government tend to be directly correlated to the public’s expectations, and 
the more citizens are educated and mature, the higher are the demands 
on high quality and timely policy interventions. This naturally creates gaps 
between the pace at which institutions and decision-making structures 
evolve and how societal values and technology evolve. Tensions emerge 
between preserving stability and acquired affluence on the one hand, and 
accompanying (or prompting necessary) change on the other. From this 
perspective, public institutions in general always experience structural 
variations in public confidence (Fukuyama, 1995). The financial and 
economic crisis of 2008 has arguably only highlighted and accelerated the 
steady decline in trust, but it has not triggered it (Blind, 2007; Bouckaert, 
2012). The post-crisis recovery context, however, significantly determines 
how public policy is implemented – and often in negative terms. Despite 
continued sophistication, accuracy and timeliness in detecting potential 
harm, the public is increasingly exposed to social amplification of risk 
that considerably affects public perception and acceptance (Renn, 2008). 
Winning the challenge of regaining and maintaining trust is crucial for 
contemporary governments (Lofstedt, 2005; OECD, 2013).
In response to the sophistication of contemporary challenges, governments 
are revising their analytic and management tools, including for their ability to 
address unintended negative consequences that arise from regulatory ac-
tivity, such as so-called ‘risk–risk trade-offs’.4 While the task to manage new 
forms of risks becomes more formidable, governments are held responsible 
for both the regulatory costs of detecting and addressing the risks as well 
as the costs of failing to prevent the risks. 
At the same time, risk regulation offers an opportunity to public au-
thorities because it provides ways for public authorities to revisit their 
role, organisation and functioning and be better equipped to address 
the double challenge of responding to ever increasing demands by the 
public for efficient action on the one hand while facing declining levels 
of trust and resource constraints on the other.
Risk regulation has yielded both successes and failures, and faces pressures 
to improve in several ways – including by learning from past experience to 
improve future design and performance. Scientific risk assessment by ex-
pert committees is increasingly complemented by assessment of concerns 
of affected parties, in an open and multi-stakeholder process. Society no 
longer contents itself with “being told” but requires to “be shown” how risk 
management options are chosen and are likely to have an impact – and it 
aspires to “be involved” in decisions (Rothstein et al., 2006).
4 Decisions taken to manage one single risk may create other countervailing risks (Graham and Wiener, 1995).
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2. Rationale and purpose of this publication
If the traditional organisational and procedural frameworks so far used by 
regulators are put into question, it is imperative to explore various fields and 
experiences with public and private risk management solutions.
The decision to embark on this publication was stimulated by the high-level 
annual conference that the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) 
organised on “Improving Risk Regulation. From Crisis Response to Learning 
and Innovation”, in collaboration with the Organisation for the Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and Duke University in October 2014.5 
The conference identified, evaluated and discussed the relevance and effec-
tiveness of new approaches to improving risk governance, both as they result 
from responding to and learning from crises, and as deliberate innovations in 
how regulatory power is exercised and shared. The research project organ-
ised by Duke University and presented on the first day of the conference will 
produce a book on policy learning from crises, with the title Policy Shock: 
Regulatory Responses to Oil Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises. 
The sessions on the second day of the conference examined several kinds 
of regulatory innovations and framed the focus of this IRGC publication.
This publication thus explores new insights for addressing contemporary 
risks. It rests on the definition of ‘risk regulation’ as the body of law intended 
to prevent, reduce or re-allocate the likelihood of harm to individuals and so-
ciety, and protect health, safety, security, and the environment from a variety 
of risks (UK Royal Society, 1992; Hood et al., 2001; OECD, 2010) – to then 
provide an overview of different forms and approaches to risk management 
by public authorities and the private sector based on interdisciplinary risk 
governance and multi-stakeholder processes. The publication highlights 
some innovative approaches to how governments and the private sector 
collaborate to improving the overall performance and efficiency of regulatory 
frameworks. It seeks to stimulate reflection among (public and private) 
regulators as well as those who are regulated on how best to design and 
implement risk regulation so as to enhance its impact and efficiency. In 
addition, the publication identifies innovative approaches that governments 
and the private sector may follow to exploit synergies and collaborate to 
ameliorate public risk management.
5 The conference programme and the presented slides can be accessed at irgc.org/event/annual-conference-2014-summary
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3. Structure of the publication 
This publication is the result of a collective effort by several international 
experts with various backgrounds. It is divided into four chapters, each of 
which introduces relevant issues and perspectives to modern public risk 
management. Taken together, the distinct dimensions and approaches pre-
sented in the chapters provide insights into how to possibly enhance the 
effectiveness and legitimacy (credibility) of risk regulation in the 21st century. 
The first essay, authored by Colin Scott (University College Dublin), explores 
the private-public interface in organising and managing societal interactions. 
Transnational private regulation regimes may provide promising comple-
mentary approaches to the governance of risk and innovation. For instance, 
transnational industry associations may help design technical standards 
that are voluntary but set performance requirements that are subsequently 
adopted and enforced by governments. The essay presents illustrative ex-
amples of the potential that transnational private regulation has on innovative 
governance, notably in relation to addressing market coordination problems, 
to complementing inadequate and inappropriate public regulation, and to 
building community solidarity (understood here as willingness by all actors 
to achieve higher societal goals).
Terry Yosie (World Environment Center) explores emerging strategies to 
manage system-level risk through enhanced collaboration between public 
and private actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
leading global companies. The paper presents examples of collaborative 
arrangements that help understand and manage at various governance levels 
risks to public health and the environment triggered by contemporary global 
mega-trends. Such collaboration – the paper argues – yields insights on the 
scale of risks, new governance models, opportunities for innovation, and 
specific risk management strategies that incorporate sustainability. Accord-
ingly, regulators should closely examine these dynamics, for they provide 
relevant information and case studies for the design of future regulatory 
strategies by modifying the scope and locus of decision-making; improving 
scientific tools and methods; identifying opportunities for collaboration across 
government, NGOs and private sector institutions; and developing a future 
research agenda.
Ortwin Renn (University of Stuttgart) and Marie-Valentine Florin (IRGC) ad-
dress one of the emerging approaches to public intervention design – applying 
insights from behavioural sciences. Their essay investigates the scope and 
challenges for behaviourally-informed risk regulation as not only effective 
but also legal and legitimate means to achieve desired behavioural change. 
Dwelling on insights from behaviourally-informed interventions, the authors 
highlight how management decisions can preserve individual choice, for 
instance through default rules, smart disclosure and simplification require-
ments. They argue that the moral and political legitimacy for collective actors 
to shape human behaviour is granted only if the overarching policy goals 
have been agreed through the democratic and inclusive process.
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The final essay constitutes a case study highlighting a practical sectoral 
application of new thinking emerging on how to improve regulation on the 
basis of enhanced collaboration between regulators, industry and the pub-
lic (patients in this case). It refers to adaptive approaches to pre-market 
drug authorisation and the essay reports on the related panel organised 
at the IRGC conference of October 2014 mentioned above. The essay is 
authored by Kenneth A. Oye (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT), 
Mark Pearson (OECD), Hans-Georg Eichler (European Medicines Agency), 
Theresa Mullin (US Food and Drug Administration) and Anton Hoos (Amgen). 
Against the background of a sector marked by rapid advances in science and 
technology, the authors highlight the main drivers of the adaptive licensing 
debate – growing patient demand for timely access to address unmet medical 
needs; emerging science of precision medicine leading to fragmentation of 
treatment populations; healthcare systems’ budgetary constraints and rising 
payer influence on product accessibility; and pressure on pharma/investors to 
ensure sustainability of drug development. The authors focus on international 
regulatory initiatives to foster innovation while improving use of pre-market 
and post-market information, thereby striking a better balance over the full 
life cycle of drugs in the trade-off between uncertain effectiveness and safety 
of the treatment and its timely application.
The concluding remarks draw lessons from the various approaches and pol-
icy areas presented in the publication. They propose possible elements for 
advancing the risk regulation agenda internationally with a view to improving 
the performance and efficiency of risk management regulatory interventions. 
In that light, public regulators might need to ‘reinvent themselves’ into 
providers of platforms that catalyse various approaches to risk manage-
ment. In doing so, however, they cannot abdicate their role as guardians 
of transparent and rigorous evidence-based decision-making.
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CONTRIBUTION OF TRANSNATIONAL 
PRIVATE REGULATION TO 
REVISITING RISK REGULATION
Introduction
When considering contemporary risk regulation approaches, one tends to 
think of how companies go about fostering and protecting innovation and 
reducing corporate risk and consequently about how governments support 
and affect the environment in which companies operate. A further dimen-
sion concerns the ways in which governments and their agencies assess 
and manage risk as a means to evaluate and implement regulation and 
other policy activities, with a view to achieving societal goals such as public 
safety or environmental protection. Governments and companies are close-
ly intertwined in these activities since state action is constitutive of many 
corporate activities that range from incorporating a company and benefiting 
from limited liability, to offering the protection of intellectual property law 
where innovation is concerned, through to establishing regulatory regimes 
that both target and create risks. 
Recently, scholars have emphasised the extent to which the emergence of 
multinational enterprises and the advent and prevalence of so-called “sys-
temic risks” has generated governance gaps from the perspective of both 
the market and governmental actors (see also paper by Terry Yosie in this 
publication). On one view these gaps comprise an insufficiency of norms 
or rules to address matters that companies must address but which they 
cannot supply for themselves on their own and which governments cannot 
or do not want to develop. This largely explains the emergence, in the early 
part of the twentieth century, of technical standardisation bodies whose 
mission was to supply the specifications, which enabled companies to rely 
on standardised components, first in manufacturing and, more recently in 
management processes, thus facilitating business and trade. In this context, 
we can see technical standards as a significant, albeit private, component of 
the regulatory environment. Such standards typically provide clear specifi-
cation as to requirements in the sector involved, even though, from a formal 
perspective, their adoption is voluntary.
by Colin Scott 1
1 Principal and Professor of EU Regulation & Governance, UCD College of Social Sciences and Law, University College Dublin, Ireland.
 This paper draws on research led by Fabrizio Cafaggi, Linda Senden and Colin Scott in a project on Transnational Private Regulation, 
funded by the Hague Institute for Internationalization of Law. The author is grateful to Lorenzo Allio and to Marie-Valentine Florin for 
their ideas in drafting the paper.
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Private governance regimes now extend well beyond national and transna-
tional technical standardisation bodies to areas such as the environment, 
employment, consumer markets, computer security and financial markets. In 
other words, the remit of the decisions by (and the mandate conferred upon) 
standardisation bodies has scaled up from affecting specific elements only of 
a normative regime to now shaping and determining entire regulatory (trans-
national) systems. They do not wholly replace public governance and there 
is frequently an explicit relationship between public activity and private rules. 
This paper first addresses and explains the concepts associated with the 
emergence of transnational private regulation. Second, it explores the emer-
gence and effects of transnational private regulation through three brief 
illustrations in financial markets, food safety and forestry that provide a ra-
tionale for the emergence of transnational regimes and/or innovative risk 
governance. The paper then investigates the various forms of relationship 
between transnational private regulation and governmental and intergov-
ernmental actors. Finally, some conclusions are offered in respect of the 
relationship between transnational private regulation, innovation and risk. The 
paper does not seek to appraise the adequacy or effectiveness of any given 
regime. Rather the paper describes and outlines reasons for the emergence 
and functioning of such regimes, with a focus on how the latter can advance 
risk regulation in modern times.
1. Towards a definition of the notion  
of transnational private regulation 
Transnational private regulation is a key example of innovative governance, 
which increasingly is shaping market practice. Indeed, the challenge is to 
explain why transnational private regulation has grown in importance and 
prominence in recent decades. This section elaborates on the three consti-
tutive elements of the term “transnational private regulation”.
1.1 
The evolutionary regulatory context
The first constituent of the term relates to regulation. The concept has gra- 
dually established itself as a significant form of governance. An influential 
definition speaks of the sustained oversight of activities valued by the pub-
lic by reference to rules (Selznick, 1985). For many, this classic definition 
conjures up the image of independent regulatory agencies of the kind that 
were developed notably in the United States during the twentieth century.2 
Canadian scholar John Willis noted that such agencies, popular also in Can-
ada, were ‘governments in miniature’ because they had the capacity to make 
rules (a legislative task), monitor compliance with rules (an executive task) 
2 One might think, for instance, of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Food and Drug Administration. The extent to which 
these agencies are “independent” of the Executive (the President) is a subject of considerable debate (Datla and Revesz, 2013).
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and enforce rules (a judicial task) in such a way as to combine all the govern-
mental functions (Doern and Schultz, 1998; Willis, 1958). The intrinsic lack of 
capacity by legislators to perform expert analysis and hence deliberate on 
many technical implementing risk regulations has been widely acknowledged 
in modern government. However, noting the rise of the regulatory state in 
Europe from the 1980s, it became clear that, contrary to US experience and 
practice, there was more caution elsewhere in delegating such extensive 
governmental functions to independent agencies. By contrast, agencies es-
tablished in European states have typically more limited powers, because of 
both historical and legal restrictions on the delegation of regulatory powers.3 
Commonly, though not universally, rulemaking powers have been reserved 
to legislatures, and formal enforcement powers to courts. 
The classic model prompted an understating of regulation as a govern-
mental function exercised by public bodies: independent agencies, or a 
combination of legislature, agencies and courts. As interest in regulation has 
grown, it has become apparent that, whilst government regulatory regimes, 
however comprised, may exert important control over businesses (and also 
others, including NGOs and government itself (Hood et al., 1999)), the control 
environment in which all manner of organisations operate is not limited to 
government oversight (Scott, 2004). For many organisations, self-regulatory 
bodies constitute an important mechanism for setting and enforcing rules 
(Ogus, 1995). Less formal norms exerted through professional bodies and 
communities may be important, constituting a form of ‘order without law’ 
(Ellickson, 1994). We may even find market mechanisms exerting a form of 
regulatory control (Marx, 2008).
These insights about the diffuse forms of control which are exerted on 
organisations led scholars to reconceive regulation from its former rather 
institutional-specific formulation into a more generic and comprehensive 
notion. Accordingly, regulation has been defined as a mode of control which 
comprises not only norms, rules, standards or objectives, but also vari-
ous mechanisms that supply feedback on compliance with the norms, as 
well as processes for correcting deviation in behaviour (Hood et al., 2001). 
Thus agency regulation is an example of where agencies not only set rules, 
monitor and enforce them, but also where they recognise a wide range of 
other modes for drawing up standards, providing feedback and correction, 
including both formal and informal social processes, and possibly market 
mechanisms. Taking this approach we can recognise that few environments 
are free of regulation in this broader sense, and a decision of government 
not to engage in formal public regulation is most likely to leave control to a 
mix of social norms and market mechanisms (such as contracts). 
3 What pertains the EU-level, reference can be made here to the reluctance by EU Member States to confer further regulatory compe-
tences to supra-national bodies (the EU agencies) and their preference to retain control over EU technical regulation through a system 
of committee-based governance. The so-called “Meroni doctrine” on non-delegation of decision-making powers to de-centralised 
bodies draws from that concern.
16 //  Improving Risk Regulation
1.2 
The nature and scope of private regulation
The second element of the term refers to its private character. Because of 
the evolving context mentioned above, private regulation assumes a more 
important role in contemporary governance than might previously have been 
expected. Companies create norms specifically for their own employees, 
which are monitored and enforced through contractual relationships (Parker, 
2002). Such in-company regulation may often be quite informal in character, 
even though it has the ‘capacity to harden’, for example when addressing 
issues of underperformance or misconduct. Similarly, the measures tak-
en by companies to address corporate social responsibility issues can be 
characterised as a form of in-company regulation, especially when they are 
orientated towards developing and implementing norms which address an 
aspect of company performance in respect to such issues as the environment 
or equality (Parker, 2007). Demonstrating a capacity for regulatory innovation, 
governments have become increasingly interested in how companies may 
contribute to meeting public objectives through corporate social responsi-
bility programmes and have sought to encourage them, for example through 
mandatory reporting requirements.4 
The scope of private regulation and its implications are not to be conceived 
narrowly. On the one hand, private regulation encompasses not only in-com-
pany regulation but also a wide range of mechanisms by which standards 
are set, monitored and enforced through private organisations (Scott, 2002). 
Self-regulatory or associational regimes emerge where a group of organisa-
tions agree to create an association with rules and feedback and enforcement 
mechanisms (Buthe and Mattli, 2011; Black, 1996). Professional bodies 
operate in a similar manner. Whilst associational regimes are founded on 
a form of collective contract that binds the members, bilateral contractual 
relations can also be used to embed rules set by the parties or introduced 
by a third party organisation. In practice, such contracts, operated through 
supply chain contracts and often with third party certification, are extremely 
important mechanisms for giving effect to rules set down by private organ-
isations, including technical standardisation bodies, associational regimes, 
and others (Cafaggi and Iamiceli, 2014). We might, of course, expect such 
bilateral arrangements to reflect the interests of one or both of the parties 
to the arrangement. In some instances, such provisions are liable to reflect 
a wider public interest (for example contractual specifications that products 
are safe or that they should comply with a particular technical standard).
A key challenge for governments which might seek to depend on such con-
tractual regulation is to recognise the conditions under which there is an 
alignment between public and private interests (with the consequence that 
no further public regulation is required) and the conditions where private and 
public interest diverge, requiring public intervention (for example on compe-
tition, environmental or consumer protection grounds). 
4 An example is the EU Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and 
groups.
Improving Risk Regulation  // 17
On the other hand, increasingly, the in-company and contractual (collective 
and bilateral) modes of private regulation have an impact on a wider range 
of actors and organisations and not exclusively those who are, in a sense, 
volunteers to the regime. Where third parties are affected by such a private 
regime to which they are not party, this is potentially problematic as such 
third parties have no capacity to shape the regime or to decide whether or 
not to accept it (Scott et al., 2011). Thus many private regimes are estab-
lished by industry or NGO actors or some combination of the two, with an 
identity which is autonomous from any particular organisation, and which 
determine rules and processes for organisations well beyond the scope of 
their own organisations. 
Technical standardisation bodies provide a key example. Firms and other 
representatives may participate in the process, but many, perhaps most of 
those who adopt the standards, do not participate in the decision-making and 
need have no link with the standard-setting organisation. To an even greater 
extent those who benefit from the standards, such as those who purchase 
the products, have no involvement, whether directly or indirectly, in drawing 
up the standards. Increasingly, organisations addressing matters such as 
environmental protection, employment and human rights are autonomous 
from those for whom they create the standards, with distinct corporate iden-
tity and motivations, but also from those who benefit from the standards.
If such private institutions do not have legislative backing and are not con-
tractually linked to those for whom they write the standards, the question 
then arises about the effectiveness and binding character of the rules these 
institutions issue. Answers are varied. In some cases, private standards are 
adopted by governments in their practices or through legislation (as with some 
technical standards and financial standards) (Scott, 2002). In other cases 
effectiveness is dependent on organisations deciding voluntarily to adopt 
the standards and implement them in-company and/or through specifying 
them in contracts. In practice, supply chain contracts are very important for 
giving effect to a wide range of technical and other standards (Cafaggi and 
Iamiceli, 2014).
1.3 
The scale of application of the regime
The third definitional component of transnational private regulation is the 
transnational element. This concept is simply explained as describing a 
regime which crosses national boundaries in its effects but is not public or 
governmental in origin (Scott and Wai, 2004). Thus transnational activity 
is contrasted with international governance, the latter occurring between 
nations and engaging sovereign governments, for example in making and 
implementing treaties (Scott et al., 2011). 
The scope of transnational private regulatory regimes is very broad, with 
prominent examples found in the many transnational technical standardi-
sation bodies, food safety, advertising, financial markets and environmental 
protection. Equally, the form such regimes take is quite diverse. Some con-
sist of associations of members (such as the group of national advertising 
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self-regulatory bodies, the European Advertising Standards Alliance) whilst 
others originate from NGO activity and draw in industry and NGO members, 
such as with the Forest Stewardship Council. Each regime can be charac-
terised as constituting a community of actors, and in each case the regimes 
face not only technical challenges in undertaking their mission, but also 
legitimacy challenges in justifying their governance actions and subsequent 
effects on members and third parties (Kingsbury, Krisch and Steward, 2005; 
Cassese et al., 2012). 
2. Emergence and effects: three cases
This section presents brief illustrations in financial markets, food safety and 
forestry that provide a rationale for the emergence of transnational private reg-
ulatory regimes. In some instances, such regimes have emerged to address 
market coordination problems, where cooperation over standards facilitates 
market activity. A second rationale for the growth of private regulation lies in 
concerns about the adequacy and appropriateness of national public regula-
tion for addressing (transnational) risks, especially those labelled as ‘systemic 
risks’, marked by international networks, complexity and cascading effects. 
In these cases, transnational private regulation seeks to impose standards 
on market actors that go beyond public law requirements, or aims to improve 
implementation. A third rationale for the emergence of transnational regimes 
is that of building community solidarity around social objectives at a level 
greater than that able to be adopted by national governments.
The first two of these rationales address what are primarily market-based 
concerns. The final one uses various forms of activism to promote adoption 
of social or community concerns in market settings. In each case the market 
is of fundamental importance in explaining both the reasons for, and modes 
of, adoption.
2.1 
Market coordination problems
The first case presented in this paper lies in the development and adoption 
of standards to facilitate market activity. The development of technical stand-
ards processes from the early national standardisation bodies, established 
in the first quarter of the twentieth century, to the creation of an elaborate 
architecture involving thousands of standardisation bodies with hundreds 
of thousands of participants in their activities, is directed at providing the 
conditions for efficient trading and contracting for the supply of products 
where there is a high degree of specialisation and differentiation of tasks 
(Brunsson, 2000). Complex manufactured products, for example, may involve 
dozens of different producers in developing and producing components 
and manufacturers need to be assured that whoever they buy from, the 
components they purchase will meet their needs through compliance and a 
standard specification.
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The case of financial markets
Equally, in the area of financial markets, there is a need for reliable stand-
ards. A prime example is that of the market for derivatives that emerged as a 
mechanism for hedging financial risks and which, over time, became a source 
of systemic risk to the financial system. The issue of reliability with deriva-
tives transactions concerns the terms on which they are written. The parties 
require certainty concerning what they have agreed; what events will trigger 
payments contractually; what the effects will be under interlinked agreements; 
and, in particular, whether the intention of the parties to net the effects of 
their agreements will be honoured. In the absence of any public regulation of 
such agreements, the parties write their own contracts. Starting from scratch 
is both costly and full of uncertainty. The International Swaps and Dealers 
Association (ISDA), comprising the major dealer banks, was established in the 
1990s and amongst its core activities has been drafting the standard terms 
on which derivatives contracts are made, the ISDA Master Agreement. It is 
not compulsory to use the Master Agreement, but ISDA is very active, in a 
number of ways, in ensuring that through drafting, usage and interpretation, 
its terms should, as far as possible, be predictable for the parties. ISDA may 
imply that they are not a regulatory body since the standards in the Master 
Agreement are not mandatory, and implementation and enforcement are 
matters for the parties. However, it has progressively become clear that 
the Master Agreement is the de facto in terms of business. Its effects on 
third parties, including states (for example in respect of derivatives linked to 
sovereign debt), are such that the role of ISDA goes beyond that of simple 
setter of technical standards. Indeed, it has an overview of the entire life of 
transactions and of their terms and enforcement (Biggins and Scott 2012).
2.2 
Lack of adequacy and appropriateness of national 
public regulation: the case of food safety
If technical standardisation is more concerned with market settings where 
the state has no significant role in drawing up standards, there is another set 
of conditions where state involvement is significant but inadequate. When, 
due to insufficient standardisation, public regulatory rules are inadequate or 
badly implemented, producers run the risk of damaging their reputation and 
losing sales because of diminished confidence in their products. As from 
the 1980s a series of scandals involving food products, such as the BSE 
crisis in Europe in the 1990s or the outbreak of E.coli infection in Germany 
in 2011, left major food retailers in Europe feeling that the food regulation 
regime in the member states of the EU, some of which has EU components, 
was insufficient to create confidence in food products. The industry response 
was for larger retailers and other key stakeholders to establish a number of 
standardisation bodies which initially imposed safety standards on producers, 
wherever they were located within or beyond the boundaries of the EU. These 
standards are implemented through supply chain contracts and processes 
of accreditation for producers (Fuchs et al., 2011). 
20 //  Improving Risk Regulation
A key example is provided by GlobalGAP 5, established in the 1990s by major 
European retailers, a forum for setting detailed standards for food products 
and agricultural practice. If, initially, the group was rather informal, it has 
progressively constitutionalised itself and drawn into its decision-making 
a wider range of affected parties, notably food producer representatives. 
Additionally, it has introduced certification procedures to ensure compliance 
(Casey, 2009). Thus, over time, the regime has progressively increased its 
share of those affected by its decision-making as a means to bolster legit-
imacy through a more democratic structure. In recent years, its reach has 
been such that GlobalGAP is regarded as jointly empowering producers 
and retailers. This contrasts with some other regimes which remain retailer 
dominated (Fuchs et al., 2011).
For retailers who impose GlobalGAP standards on producers, compliance 
is a condition of contracting and thus a prerequisite for trade. Accordingly, 
the scope of GlobalGAP activities affects not only supply chain contracts 
but also trade in general. The appropriate treatment within the global trade 
regime of private standards, not just in respect of food, but also in respect 
of other social matters such as the environment and labour rights, is con-
troversial. For some, the solution is to seek to regulate private standards 
in the same way as public legislation would be controlled if it constituted a 
barrier to trade. For others, socially constituted standards, though they may 
affect trade, are a product of community and market actions, and should be 
accorded a separate space, distinct from the trade regime which regulates 
attempts by states to protect their producers (Bernstein and Hannah, 2008).
2.3 
Building community solidarity around social 
objectives: the case of forestry 
A third case concerns the conditions where market actors are content with 
public standards and, broadly, seek to comply with, but not exceed them. 
However, social actors such as environmental NGOs and trade unions strive 
to adopt more stringent standards on a transnational basis. Given the impor-
tance of companies in implementing voluntary standards, these conditions 
appear unpromising for effective transnational private regulation (Bartley, 
2007). However, it has proved possible for NGOs and other social actors to 
develop both the more stringent standards and market salience for them, to 
the point that companies have felt it in their market interests to adopt them. 
By doing so, companies are able to preserve or enhance reputation and thus 
strengthen their market position (Cashore, 2002). Under pressure from civil 
society actors, such an exacting adjustment of standards by market actors 
can be defined as a form of community solidarity.
From this solidarity perspective, transnational private regulation regimes may 
also address risk, both to companies and to broader society alike. Whilst 
national governments may be inhibited to adopt more stringent standards for 
environmental protection and labour rights by fear of national competitive-
ness, transnational regimes are able to persuade multinational enterprises 
to take up such standards across their enterprises, thus raising standards 
transnationally above public norms.5 www.globalgap.org/uk_en
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A key example of such a phenomenon is provided by the growth in importance 
of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), whose standards on sustainable 
forestry have been taken up by many larger retailers and applied throughout 
their transnational supply chains. This is a central example of such socially 
driven private regulation. A number of regimes have developed over the past 
two decades, some led by NGOs and others, responding to the NGO regimes, 
that have a more substantial industry involvement. The FSC, which the World 
Wildlife Fund (an international environmental NGO) helped establish, provides 
a significant case (Cashore et al., 2004). The FSC developed standards dur-
ing the late 1990s and sought to have retailers join their scheme and to sign 
up to incorporating its standards in their supply chain contracts.6 The key 
issues for the FSC regime, similarly to GlobalGAP, concerns how it manages 
decision-making processes over standards and their implementation and the 
distributional effects of its regime within the forestry sector (Taylor, 2005).
3. Evaluation of transnational private regulation 
in relation to risk and to public policy
Risk is a major organisational concept, both for contemporary business 
and for society at large. Risk is not straightforward to define since it is the 
combination of the probability and the impact of an adverse outcome. In 
a recent guide to the vocabulary of risk, the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) offered a simple definition of risk as ‘the effect of uncer-
tainty on objectives’ (ISO, 2009). Increasingly, organisations of all kinds seek 
to identify the risks they face so that they can reallocate them (for example 
through contracts), manage them (for example eliminate them) or, when they 
cannot be reallocated or eliminated, insure against them.
Regulation is used both for curbing risky activity (for example nuclear power, 
factory safety and so on) (Hood et al., 2001), and for deploying risk-based 
analysis to determine the appropriate allocation of resources, for example 
in considering frequency and stringency of inspections (Baldwin and Black, 
2010). For businesses, regulation may be classed as a source of risk that, 
over and above the detection of breaches, is far more centrally concerned 
with mandated changes to the operating environment faced by business 
as, over time, regulatory objectives change in response to changing social 
or political preference.
Increasingly, regulation is concerned as much with the oversight of risky 
activities as with the efficient operation of markets. Contemporary risk chal-
lenges, for which regulation forms a significant part of the response, include 
the management of systemic risk – for instance in relation to the adverse 
effects of anthropogenic climate change; of potentially catastrophic accidents 
in nuclear power production; and the complex interdependencies in financial 
markets within a globalised economy. 
6 Similar experiences can be found in other sectors, such as the fishery industry in the form of the Marine Stewardship Council.
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A core feature of some modes of transnational private regulation is that 
businesses and other actors may take on a central role in defining both the 
objectives and the implementation of the regime. Real world observation sug-
gests that many regimes are centrally concerned with addressing risks. These 
can include those activities that are inherently risky such as food production; 
they can arise from activities which generate climate risks, such as forestry; 
and from those which generate risk because of uncertainty and market im-
perfections (e.g. in the financial market sector). Thus the numerous private 
food standards regimes, of which GlobalGAP is a key example, provide a core 
supplement to public risk regulation over food. Equally, regimes targeted at 
sustainable forestry constitute a core part of the measures taken to address 
risks associated with climate change. The ISDA Master Agreement provides 
a core example of addressing uncertainty. It puts the central focus on being 
able to establish and test the standards that govern derivatives instruments 
so that they may be reliably and predictably deployed.
The private regimes that target risky activities also generate risk for business-
es. At the extreme, businesses that do not participate, or do not participate 
effectively, in socially driven regimes concerned with matters such as em-
ployment rights or climate change may find they are not able to participate in 
the market at all, or that reputation and sales suffer as they are identified as 
a cause of the problem rather than constituting part of the solution. Hence, 
there is a strong incentive to enter into collaborative agreements among 
private actors, as also argued by Terry Yosie in this publication. Much of the 
contestation around socially driven regimes of private regulation is concerned 
with creating a situation where, due to reputational and market damage, 
the risk to business in adopting a progressive (and perhaps costly) regime 
concerning environmental issues or labour rights, is lesser than that of not 
participating. The Forest Stewardship Council provides an example of a 
campaigning regime which has progressively persuaded more companies 
to take on its standards through direct action. It highlights the adverse ef-
fects of poor forestry practices (Meidinger, 2003). Facing such campaigns, 
companies have concluded that the less risky option is to adopt the regime.
Whilst transnational private regulation is defined by its non-governmental 
character, governments and inter-governmental organisations may be in-
volved in such regimes. Many regimes may be characterised as hybrid, in 
the sense that public bodies engage in observing and, in some cases, either 
delegating the making of standards, or adopting standards that have been 
drawn up through a number of mechanisms. Governmental and inter-govern-
mental organisations are increasingly involved in observing environmental, 
food, consumer and financial standardisation regimes that operate through 
private regimes. The European Commission, for example, has taken a close 
interest in private advertising regulation regimes in the EU and has sought 
to bolster their standing within national settings so that they may, at least 
implicitly, hold a place in key regulatory delegations (European Commission, 
2006). As a result, the European Commission has set up a ‘community of 
practice’ concerned with self- and co-regulation as a means to engage all 
the stakeholders involved in support of both the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of such private regulation across a wider range of policy areas. 
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Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to provide an overview of transnational private 
regulation, why and where it can be relevant. Whilst private regulation has 
emerged as an important component of contemporary regulatory governance 
generally, and risk regulation in particular, there are clear limitations associated 
with it. First, in some areas, such private regulation may lack the legitimacy 
to command wide support from market and social actors. Equally, there 
may be a lack of effective capacity in some transnational private regulatory 
regimes. There is increasing evidence of these issues being addressed, for 
example through umbrella organisations such as ISEAL-ALLIANCE (Loconto 
and Fouilleux, 2014) which offer both capacity and legitimation.
The question of the contribution of transnational private regulation to risk reg-
ulation yields a variety of answers because of the wide range of regime types 
and of their differing origins. Within the coordination type regimes, market 
issues around risk and innovation could be addressed effectively since the 
coordinating standards are designed to reduce risks through standardisation. 
This issue is reflected in debates over standards that regulate matters such 
as mobile phone networks, video players and computer operating systems. 
Research on standardisation suggests that a successful standard may not be 
the most innovative, but rather one which, for reasons other than innovation 
and effectiveness, secures wide take-up or rewards performance without 
creating lock-ins to existing technologies or practices. The classic exam-
ple is the standardised QWERTY typewriter keyboard, which was not ever 
necessarily the most efficient layout, but has survived into a period where 
its rationale is long gone because of its ubiquity and the costs of re-learning 
that would be associated with adopting what might only be a marginally more 
efficient layout (David, 2001).
The case where public rules are deemed inadequate and are supplemented 
presents greater challenges for risk. In some cases, transnational private 
regimes may address risky activities, driven by market actors, to supplement 
inadequate public regimes. Where well constituted, such regimes may permit 
market actors to engage their concerns, possibly tackling issues effectively 
with greater efficiency than could be achieved by public regimes. However, 
there are always likely to be concerns that such private regimes derive from 
the market power of key companies, and that they may be used to further 
enhance market power of these key companies over other actors, whether 
suppliers or competitors. Thus they represent competition risks to which, 
increasingly, national competition authorities will need to be attentive. 
Socially driven regimes have gradually emerged to address risks associated 
with environmental issues and with employment rights in transnational set-
tings. These regimes have varying degrees of company involvement in their 
founding, but they all provide an opportunity to address substantive risks 
and to engage with important reputation-associated market risks of a social 
nature. Such regimes represent both a risk and an opportunity. Recognising 
this factor, competing companies have entered and shaped regimes across a 
variety of social issues. Such competition between NGOs- and company-led 
regimes, for example in forestry and labour rights, is likely to be a source of 
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regulatory innovation, as the various organisations learn what kind of stand-
ards are most able to meet the policy objectives and be readily capable of 
implementation by the firms involved. In this context, because of the more 
direct participation and market testing of the regime whether in its origin or its 
implementation, private regulation has the potential to better fit the require-
ments of innovative markets than traditional public regulation. As it will be 
apparent in further contributions to this publication, the interaction between 
private sector actors and NGOs can evolve from (constructive) competition 
into a more comprehensive joint action. Whatever shape it takes, the question 
of the effect and impact of private regulation as compared to public regula-
tion is becoming more important both for public and private organisations. If 
we are to address the problems that contemporary risk management poses 
us, it is time to devote to this under-researched agenda the full attention it 
deserves (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014; Radaelli and Fritsch, 2012).
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EMERGING STRATEGIES TO MANAGE 
SYSTEM-LEVEL RISKS   
AN EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR, GOVERNMENT 
AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION INITIATIVES
Escalating global megatrends generate new sources of risk to public health 
and the environment, and present challenges to the effectiveness of existing 
regulatory processes and management of global companies. Collaboration 
between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and leading global com-
panies has intensified leading to a better understanding and management of 
these risks at local, regional and global levels. Such collaboration is yielding 
insights into the scale of risks, new governance models, opportunities for 
innovation, and specific risk management strategies that incorporate sus-
tainability. Discussion of these inter-related issues can generate important 
information and case studies for the design of future regulatory strategies by: 
modifying the scope and locus of decision-making, improving scientific tools 
and methods, identifying opportunities for collaboration across government, 
NGO and private sector institutions, and developing a future research agenda.
1. The changing context of risk
For several decades, academics, policymakers, business managers and 
non-governmental organizations have taught, designed and implemented 
regulatory policies and corporate practices to assess, mitigate and manage 
individual public health and environmental risks or discrete clusters of risks. 
The risk agenda has ranged from exposure to individual chemicals (e.g., 
trichloroethylene in ground water) to groups of inter-related chemical families 
(e.g., dioxins in soils, or the atmosphere, or the release of ozone-depleting 
compounds that reach the stratosphere). The many successes in ameliorating 
the management of such risks have become the foundation for regulatory 
policy and corporate management systems as well as the international cer-
tification standard ISO 14001 developed by the International Organization 
for Standardization.
More recently, the emerging knowledge of global megatrends related to 
climate change, water scarcities, challenges to expanding food production, 
by Terry F. Yosie 1
1 President & CEO, World Environment Center, www.wec.org
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changes in disease vectors, loss of biodiversity and other effects associated 
with a globalized economy, expanded global population and an increasing 
middle class has begun to transform the understanding of risk. This changing 
context of risk, as displayed in Figure 1, developed by the World Economic 
Forum 2, recognizes several important factors:
• Risks co-exist simultaneously at the local, regional and global levels.
• Economic, geopolitical, environmental, societal and technological risks 
increasingly co-exist and migrate outside their own boundaries (e.g., 
water shortages contribute to political conflicts, then failure to invest in 
infrastructure contributes to water-borne diseases or exacerbation of storm 
surges and flooding that, in turn, lead to disruptions in the electricity supply).
• Managing inter-connected risks effectively requires the development of 
new decision-making frameworks and institutional capacity and new types 
of regulatory arrangements based on collaboration across value chain 
participants.
 
	  
Figure 1: Global Risk Perception Survey 2014, World Economic Forum. Survey respondents were asked to select between 
three and six trends and to identify for each the risk they believe is most interconnected.
2 www.weforum.org/globalrisks2015
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The transformation of these and other risk characteristics greatly contributes 
to the growing complexity of decision-making and the potential for disrup-
tion at differing levels of scale. Irrespective of whether the risks manifest 
themselves in turbulent financial markets, the transmission of the Ebola 
virus or the ability of terrorist groups to fill political vacuums in failed states 
(e.g. ISIS in the Iraqi and Syrian territories), they have transcended existing 
decision-making frameworks and institutions and have evolved into broader 
system-level challenges.3 
2. Tools and methods for managing 
system-level risks
System-level thinking and governance in public, private and other non-gov-
ernmental institutions that have to manage environmental, health, safety and 
sustainability risks are considerably aided by the emergence of new sets of 
tools and analytical frameworks. These include:
• End-to-end traceability of ingredients or compounds that provide a system-
level view of their movement across supply chains and markets and 
identify potential risks. For example, traceability systems utilize information 
technologies that ‘track and trace’ the sourcing, production, processing, 
distribution and use of food ingredients from ‘farm to fork’ to provide 
a better understanding of growing practices, disease prevention, steps 
to prevent spoilage and waste and 
increase consumer safety. The use of 
traceability sensors that are embedded 
across these functions provide private 
companies, regulatory agencies and 
consumers with additional information 
to make their individual decisions 
‘smarter’ and timelier. In the US, the 
2010 Food Safety and Modernization 
Act provided the Food and Drug 
Administration with increased 
authority and capability to implement 
such traceability systems. An example 
of the application of a traceability 
system in the food production sector 
is provided in Figure 2.
Traceability technologies, and the data reporting and analytics that result 
from them, are finding increased and more diverse applications across a 
range of business functions. They include chemical companies that seek 
to prevent the diversion of chemical products into weaponry; pharmaceu-
tical producers committed to preventing the development of counterfeit 
drugs and medical devices; automotive and technology companies that 
have to manage thousands of sourced materials in the production of cars 
3 Terry F. Yosie, “Rethinking Governance for a Changing World,” www.greenbiz.com, April 18, 2013.
End-to-end Traceability for a System Level View
Figure 2: IBM-World Environment 
Center, Innovations for Environmental 
Sustainability Council Workshop, 
February 2012
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or mobile phones and ensure a robust recycling system for the afterlife of 
product components.
• Emergence of value chain analysis. A value chain consists of the economic 
participants involved in the creation and use of a product or service. The 
functions involved in a value chain include: product or service design; 
sourcing and storage of raw and processed materials; procurement of 
goods and services from suppliers; manufacturing, packaging, distribution 
and logistics for produced goods, customer/consumer use; and re-use or 
recycling of the goods, materials and waste for the product afterlife. As 
an illustration, Figure 3 presents the value chain for the natural gas sector.
In recent years, as concerns about the adequacy of food supplies, wa-
ter and other essential materials have emerged, business managers and 
policymakers have focused their attention on leveraging value chains for 
sustainability objectives. Companies such as Marks & Spencer and Uni-
lever, for example, have applied a value chain approach to estimate and 
offset their global greenhouse gas releases. Such analyses build upon 
the evaluation of their respective carbon and water footprints and have 
informed corporate goal setting, development of strategic initiatives and 
collaboration with other business partners and stakeholders. The US En-
vironmental Protection Agency’s proposed controls of greenhouse gases 
for existing power plants has also utilized a value chain approach for 
reducing pollution.4
Figure 3: The natural gas infrastructure in the United States, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010, p. 59.
	  
4 Yosie T. (2015), “The Marketplace as Policy Innovator,” in The Environmental Forum (January-February), www.eli.org
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• Expansion of financial and sustainability reporting. For decades, the 
standards for corporate financial reporting have focused on ‘material’ issues: 
those issues that impact, or are reasonably expected to affect, company 
decisions, including liquidity, capital resources, operational performance 
and broader reputation. Such reporting parameters shape both business 
planning and disclosure to shareholders. More recently, environmental and 
sustainability reporting has begun to incorporate aspects of materiality 
as it has an influence on the economic, environmental and social impact 
of a company. These ‘materiality assessments,’ as recommended by the 
Global Reporting Initiative and other entities, survey both internal and 
external stakeholder expectations concerning issues such as: risks facing 
the company; business priorities; and future performance outcomes. A 
growing number of companies have decided to integrate their financial 
and sustainability reporting to acquire a more systemic view of risks and 
opportunities and to strengthen the understanding of the relationship 
between sustainability and business strategy among senior managers 
and executives. The evolution of more formal processes and standards for 
integrated reporting, such as those being developed by the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (SASB), will provide a further incentive to 
achieve integrated reporting and to embed sustainable development more 
formally into the corporate governance process.5
The National Research Council of the US National Academies recently issued 
a report evaluating a broad array of existing and emerging tools and method-
ologies for improving the policy frameworks of environmental sustainability. 
The recommendations of the report are based on an examination of global 
megatrends, private sector case studies and an evaluation of collaboration 
initiatives between non-governmental organizations and global companies. 
A major purpose of the report, funded by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), was “to strengthen a system-thinking approach” by EPA.6 
3. Emerging strategies to manage 
system-level risks 
An examination of strategies to manage system-level risks reveals an in-
creasing degree of experimentation across government, business institutions 
and NGOs to develop programmes and initiatives that can be scaled to the 
level of the problems presented. These efforts are also noteworthy for their 
innovations in areas such as the scale of collaboration with independent 
partners; emergence of improved governance processes; and the thought 
leadership agenda. What follows are a set of examples that illustrate the 
transition towards managing system-level risks.
5 See, for example, the recommendations being developed by SASB, www.sasb.org 
6 National Research Council (2014), Sustainability Concepts in Decision-Making: Tools and Approaches for the US Environmental 
Protection Agency, US National Academies.
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3.1 
Coca-Cola’s global water strategy
Because water is the single largest resource utilized in the company’s supply 
chain, a resource that is under increasing pressure, the company began to 
assess water-related risks in its business more than a decade ago. In 2004, 
it conducted a qualitative assessment of water risks to individual business 
units. The risk portfolio included wastewater compliance, water supply eco-
nomics and efficiency, water resource sustainability and supply reliability, 
and societal risks. This initial assessment was followed by a more detailed, 
plant-level quantitative risk assessment prepared in 2005 and 2008-2009.
From these evaluations emerged the conclusions that Coca-Cola needed 
to manage water risks as part of a core business framework that included 
four elements: plant performance, watershed protection, sustainable com-
munities and global awareness and action. It developed specific goals and 
made them public to improve water efficiency 20% by 2012 using a 2004 
baseline; recycle 100% fully treated effluent water; by 2020, replenish water 
supplies to communities and watershed to the same level as they had been 
withdrawn; achieve more sustainable water sourcing plans for all plants by 
2012; and integrate the company’s supply chain – encompassing water use, 
soil health, biodiversity, and sugarcane production – into its water strategy.
To implement these and other initiatives, Coca-Cola developed a series of 
partnerships with organizations that had strong technical capabilities, on-the-
ground presence in major watersheds and markets, and global scale. These 
partners have included the US Agency for International Development, the 
United Nations Development Programme, the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), The Nature Conservancy, the International Finance Corporation, and 
the Global Water Challenge. The company periodically provides public updates 
on its performance for each of the major global water strategy elements.7
3.2 
Unilever’s Sustainable Living Plan
Unilever is a global consumer products company that, beginning in Novem-
ber 2010, has committed to decoupling its future growth from environmental 
impacts, while increasing the benefits of its products and other activities to 
society. Through the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan (USLP), the company 
is seeking to achieve three large goals supported by the attainment of nine 
specific commitments by 2020. The three goals include: 1) helping more than 
one billion people take action to improve their health and well-being; 2) reducing 
environmental impact by halving the greenhouse gas impacts of its products 
across the lifecycle, and achieving a 50% reduction in water consumption 
associated with the consumer use of its products; and 3) enhancing livelihoods.
As part of its analysis of global environmental risks and challenges, Unilever 
has conducted a global carbon footprint analysis. Its 2014 analysis reveals 
that only 8% of the company’s global carbon footprint is attributable to its 
own operations (manufacturing, transport and retail operations), while another 
1% results from the disposal of waste. Approximately 21% of emissions result 
from upstream sourcing of raw materials, and 70% of emissions are attributed 7 www.coca-cola.com/sustainability
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to consumer use of Unilever products (resulting primarily from energy used 
in heating water for showers or cleaning laundry).8
Because so much of Unilever’s global carbon footprint is not directly within 
the company’s management control, it has evolved a strategy to collaborate 
with both consumers and upstream business partners and suppliers to offset 
and/or reduce greenhouse emissions. Specific initiatives include:
• Integrating sustainability into the company’s multiple brands as a means 
to educate and ultimately transform consumer behaviour.
• Developing carbon offsets by protecting biodiversity and changing 
agricultural practices.
• Collaborating at market scale with other consumer goods and retail 
companies through the Consumer Goods Forum for the phase-out 
of hydrofluorocarbons, a potent class of greenhouse gases used in 
refrigeration, by 2015.
These and other steps are often either incremental or experimental and as-
sist the company in learning how to develop more innovative products and 
achieve sustainability results at a greater scale. Moreover, its USLP provides 
Unilever with the ability to demonstrate shorter-term successes, while build-
ing momentum with its employees and consumers for larger scale changes 
that will also involve transformation in consumption patterns and behaviour.9 
3.3 
WWF and the transformation of risk governance
WWF, a global non-governmental organization, has invested many years in 
research, collaborative efforts with the private sector and development in-
stitutions, and public policy advocacy to address the inter-related issues of 
population growth, food production and the world’s natural resource base. 
From this work has emerged a rising level of concern about the stewardship 
of planetary resources and, in particular, the ability to provide sufficient food 
supplies for a global population expected to reach 9 billion people by the 
year 2050.
Several key assumptions underlay WWF’s recent efforts to manage the global 
risks of insufficient food supplies. They include: 
• Population growth that, per se, is not the principal defining issue for 
maintaining sufficient food supplies in the future. Rather, increases in per 
capita income levels are driving current and future food consumption (and 
the kinds of food being produced). The speed of global change in food 
consumption is the game changer.
• The world has not yet experienced the full impact of increased demands 
from India for natural resources, and manufactured and consumer goods.
• Governments at the national and international levels have proven ineffective 
at managing the necessary steps (e.g., eliminating water subsidies, 
8 Unilever Sustainable Living Plan Update (2014), Scaling for Impact Global Summary, “Unilever’s Greenhouse Gas Footprint,” p. 5.
9  For an update on the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, please refer to www.unilever.com/sustainability.
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adopting policies that reflect the true cost of food production, preventing 
soil erosion) to ensure that food production can be sustained over the 
longer-term.
One innovative approach in thinking about the challenge of feeding a world 
with 9 billion people is to redefine it as an opportunity to transform risk 
governance. Jason Clay of WWF and his colleagues have examined the 
multiple complexities of food production in the marketplace and concluded 
that there are multiple leveraging opportunities for introducing a sustainable 
production of key food commodities. For example, a number of the world’s 
major food commodities (e.g., beef, cocoa, palm oil, sugar, salmon) are pro-
duced, processed and marketed by a relatively small number of very large 
companies. Many of these companies co-exist in common food value chains 
and, thus, have pre-existing business relationships with each other, or they 
possess detailed knowledge of each other’s operations because they are 
competitors. Figure 4 illustrates the participation of major companies in key 
food commodity sectors.10 
Using its power to act as an independent convener of global food compa-
nies, WWF has assembled roundtables of key commodity producers for a 
number of purposes: sharing best practices for sustainable food production; 
collaborating to share information where they possess a common interest; 
and building support for voluntary standards. Believing that such partnerships 
with marketplace actors can move faster and achieve more substantial re-
sults than the slower pace of government policy, WWF is aiming to transform 
agricultural production through a new model of networked governance.11 
This model addresses issues such as soil health, food waste reduction, 
opportunities for technological innovation, information sharing and learning, 
creation of new metrics to better define productivity, environmental impact 
and nutrition, and development of certification standards.
Figure 4: Participation of major 
companies in key food commodity 
sectors, Jason Clay (2013)
10 Clay J. (2013), “Feeding 9 Billion,” in tedxtalks.ted.com/video; and Clay, J. (2013), “Spawning a Sustainable Industry for Farm-
Raised Salmon”, in Guardian Sustainable Business, August 14, 2013.
11 Clay, J. (2013), “Feeding 9 Billion”.
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3.4 
New York’s PlaNYC 12
One of the most comprehensive sustainable governance initiatives (PlaNYC, 
Plan a Greener, Greater New York) has been developed in New York City. 
Originally published in October 2007, PlaNYC received added impetus, 
definition and scope in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. 
The core goal of PlaNYC is not only to develop an economically stronger 
metropolitan area but also to ensure its economic, environmental and social 
resilience over time through its ability to manage and adapt to a widening 
range of risks and opportunities.
As presently designed, PlaNYC represents a comprehensive rethinking of 
managing housing and neighbourhoods, water supply and waterways, energy 
sourcing and distribution, wastewater management and economic develop-
ment. PlaNYC currently involves 25 participating city agencies and multiple 
stakeholders from academia, business, community, environmental and other 
organizations.
This collaboration has committed to implementing a number of specific goals 
for each major PlaNYC element, including the application of 5 million square 
feet (464,515 m2) of reflective rooftops and other energy efficiency measures; 
upgrading building codes (e.g., installing flood-proof equipment and elevating 
critical energy and wastewater treatment equipment to higher levels – even 
within existing buildings); planting 850,000 trees; reducing carbon emissions 
by 19% since 2005 as part of an overall commitment to achieve a 30% 
reduction by 2030; investing in natural systems; upgrades to wastewater 
treatment facilities to protect against storm surges; redesign of storm water 
drainage infrastructure; and restoring coastal ecosystems (PlaNYC, 2014).
To guide city officials and their stakeholders in understanding infrastructure 
vulnerability to climate change impacts, the city applies a climate change 
advisory process with leading scientists and engineers evaluating current and 
longer-term climate scenarios through the 2050s for average temperature 
changes, sea level rise and other variables.13 
3.5 
San Francisco Bay Region’s resilience initiatives
Infrastructures of other urban areas are threatened similarly by climate change 
and other risk factors. In addition to its on-going concerns about earthquake 
damage, the San Francisco Bay region is at risk from sea level rise estimated 
to range between 16 to 55 inches (40.64 to 139.7 cm) by 2100 even while 
the region expects to experience continued population growth. To extend 
this analysis to a more granular level, significant portions of the railway lines, 
stations and other infrastructure within the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) 
system are at varying degrees of risk from sea level rise. An Alameda County 
Vulnerability Assessment (encompassing the area that includes the City of 
12 www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/home/home.shtml 
13 www.nyc.gov/planyc, and author interview with Carter H. Strickland, Jr., Commissioner, New York City Department of 
Environmental Protection, September 10, 2013.
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Oakland) continues to examine options for making BART and other transpor-
tation assets, habitats, and land use more resilient with significant investments 
in infrastructure being planned.
Within the City of San Francisco, a set of goals to improve the sewer system 
are balancing green and grey infrastructure to address the following chal-
lenges: an aging collection system, excess storm water, seismic activities, 
sea level rise and optimization of operations. Specific improvement goals call 
for a compliant, reliable and flexible sewer system that can also respond to 
catastrophic events. Collecting and treating both sewage and storm water, 
the system modifies the resilience of the sewer system to adapt to climate 
change (including sea level rise). It looks to achieve economic and environ-
mental sustainability while maintaining ratepayer affordability. 
City officials are applying a Triple Bottom Line (TBL) assessment model to 
identify planning options and optimize their decision-making. The TBL evalua-
tion criteria include capital, operational and other costs, environmental factors 
(e.g., climate, habitat, water use, water quality, air quality, natural resource 
inputs), and social factors (e.g., ratepayer affordability, recreation and open 
space, employment, cultural resources, construction impacts, the pedestrian 
environment, noise and odor). The TBL model works as a screening process, 
but also embodies a ratings system of potential responses across financial, 
environmental and social variables. A TBL Community Values Survey is used 
as an overlay to inform the TBL model.14
4. Required skills and behaviours  
for system-level risk management
The transition in thinking to establish new policy frameworks, business 
strategies and market-scale collaboration efforts is well underway. A major 
by-product of this development is the redefinition of important skills and 
behavioural attributes that are critical for future success. Evaluation of these 
issues has yielded a clearer understanding of the critical skills that need to 
be taught in business, engineering and public policy schools. These skills 
include:15
• Expertise in one or more areas of foundational knowledge: economics, 
finance, marketing, operations management, and physical, biological or 
social sciences.
• Understanding of basic legal standards or requirements (e.g., clean air or 
clean water legislation and regulation).
14 San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, Citizen’s Advisory Committee, Wastewater Subcommittee, Triple Bottom Line Analysis, 
June 14, 2012.
15 Examples of recent thinking on these evolving skills’ needs include: “Business Skills for a Changing World: An Assessment of 
What Global Companies Need From Business Schools”, in World Environment Center and Net Impact (October 27, 2011); Neil C. 
Hawkins, Robert W. Patterson, John Mogge, and Terry F. Yosie, “Building a Sustainability Road Map for Engineering Education”, 
in Sustainable Chemistry and Engineering (November 2013); and Terry F. Yosie, “Sustainable Innovation for Private and Public 
Sector Infrastructure: Next Generation Challenges for Engineering Education”, in American Society of Civil Engineers International 
Conference on Sustainable Infrastructure, Long Beach, California, November 8, 2014.
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• Comprehension of how markets function and the role of customers’ needs 
and expectations in stimulating market responses and change.
• Integration of sustainability into core business processes – sourcing 
of materials, supply chain management, manufacturing, logistics and 
distribution and post-consumer materials management – or public sector 
decision-making (e.g., command and control regulation, calculating the 
social cost of carbon or water, integrating risk assessment and life cycle 
analysis methodologies).
• Understanding the role of ‘smart’ technologies and knowledge of data 
analytics to identify core trends and recognition of data patterns for the 
purpose of designing more ‘intelligent’ business processes and public 
policies.
• Ability to work in teams that have differing skills, behaviors, cultures and 
geographic locations.
• Knowledge of how to manage complexity and disruption to existing 
business models or processes, policy assumptions and outcomes.
One expression of how new skill sets emerge is through an examination of 
efforts to value natural capital. The idea that nature itself contains tangible 
forms of economic value has long been established as evidenced by busi-
nesses that provide eco-tourism services, pharmaceutical companies that 
obtain critical ingredients for new or modified products from tropical rainfor-
ests, and the emergence of green accounting methodologies.
Advocates for protecting key environmental resources and ecosystems from 
excessive human development and other risks have increasingly focused 
on natural capital valuation, or the extension of the economic definition of 
capital (e.g., manufactured means of production) to environmental goods and 
services. Natural capital is thus the stock of natural ecosystems that yield 
valuable goods and services, now and into the future. By better understanding 
the interrelationships that convert wastes into nutrients, for example, econo-
mists can better calculate the quantitative and qualitative value of ecosystem 
resources in the marketplace and help design policies that harmonize their 
use and preservation for longer-term societal needs.
Emerging from this examination of natural capital is not only a refinement in 
the skill sets needed but also new collaboration strategies that involve busi-
ness and non-governmental organizations (principally) but sometimes include 
government agencies and universities. A recent example is the partnership 
between The Nature Conservancy, one of the world’s largest non-government 
organizations, and the Corporate Eco Forum, another NGO but with business 
members. Together, they mobilized approximately 25 global companies and 
their in-house experts to examine natural capital valuation approaches and 
identified a growing number of opportunities to apply them in business op-
erations for purposes such as wetlands preservation, pollution abatement 
and infrastructure planning.16
16 Corporate Eco Forum and The Nature Conservancy (2012), The New Business Imperative: Valuing Natural Capital.
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5. Additional factors in building new collaboration 
strategies and policy frameworks
Corporations, non-governmental organizations and other major institutions 
increasingly conclude that they will be more successful in attaining their indi-
vidual objectives by collaborating with other partners with aligned interests. 
This realization has accelerated because of the emergence of a growing 
number of global scale problems – e.g., water resource scarcities, challenges 
to producers in providing sufficient quantities of food products, limits for key 
raw materials in manufacturing operations – as well as a heightened under-
standing that there is no single institution capable of providing a solution to 
these and other challenges.
The practice of collaboration is a familiar one to most organizations as it is a 
normal feature of customer-supplier relationships, specific government-busi-
ness partnerships or through individual initiatives that are developed with 
non-governmental organizations, universities and other partners. What is 
changing the collaboration imperative is both the need and the scale for 
new kinds of thinking about partnerships that goes beyond the traditional 
focus on individual topics such as plant performance, mitigation of discrete 
environmental risks or management of research projects. Succeeding this 
traditional focus is an agenda aimed at addressing newer sources of disrup-
tion and risks to businesses and natural systems; the need for new business 
models that can sustain profitability while providing solutions for societal 
needs; strategies for optimizing natural resource management, product and 
service innovation; and differentiation of brand value, to name a few.17
As efforts to build global-scale collaboration evolve, additional insights have 
emerged. They include:
• Business executives and policymakers must possess a ‘system-
level’ understanding of societal and environmental changes that 
are transforming the global economy and civil society. An important 
consideration in the design of future collaboration strategies is the skill 
set of senior executives of global companies, governmental agencies and 
NGOs. Where they possess competencies in collaborating with partners 
outside their sectors, these were not generally obtained through formal 
academic training but, rather, through on-the-job experience, a personal 
open mindedness about other organizations and cultures, and a recognition 
of potential value creation. Another major hurdle that many executives need 
to overcome is a tendency to consider themselves as solvers of individual 
problems rather than builders of systems of inter-connected capabilities 
and solutions. Policymakers in regulatory agencies, for example, are often 
slow to recognize and modify decisions that account for pollution as part 
of an entire value chain of economic relationships. Instead, they focus 
on emissions from an individual firm or source category. Some business 
executives are beginning to learn that issues such as population growth, 
accelerated urbanization, concerns over food security and natural resource 
17 Jane Nelson (2013), “Scaling Up Impact Through Public-Private Partnerships,” in L. Chandy, A. Hosono, H. Kharas and J. Linn, 
ed., Getting to Scale: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 305-362.
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scarcities may impact their firms in ways that can significantly affect return 
on investment metrics or payback periods for invested capital. 
As one example, future investment decisions to upgrade power generation 
systems will need to take into account demand for electricity from indi-
vidual and networked passenger vehicles, or the interconnected energy 
and water use in building design and maintenance. Only a ‘system-level’ 
understanding of the characteristics and goals across these functions 
will enable executives and policymakers to develop more innovative ap-
proaches to understand both customer and societal needs. Organizations 
and their partners that accelerate their common learning on system-level 
challenges will, over time, accrue important advantages in their ability to 
deliver business or policy solutions to their customers and citizens.
• Voluntary collaboration initiatives are important but not sufficient 
to develop solutions to global scale problems. For two reasons, it is 
unrealistic to expect that voluntary collaboration alone can ultimately 
provide effective responses to emerging megatrend challenges: 1) there are 
too many free riders in the private sector who will seek to avoid modifying 
their business plans in ways that may affect short-term financial returns; 
and 2) policymakers in many nations will seek to game any system of 
collaboration in order to protect subsidies, tax, trade or other advantages 
against other national competitors. At the same time, despite numerous 
proposals for some form of global authority to regulate the behavior of 
enterprises or nations, this option lacks legitimacy in most national, regional 
or global forums. A more viable alternative at the present time is the creation 
of global company networks, national agencies, multi-lateral institutions, 
NGOs or foundations, such as those created for the cross-border regulation 
of pharmaceutical products or the eradication of malaria. Jointly, they can 
develop licensing standards and transparency practices.18
 
6. Implications for regulatory policy
Existing regulatory policies that focus on the management and abatement 
of individual risks such as air and water pollutants, hazardous wastes and 
other chemical risks will continue to be needed to provide protection to pub-
lic health and the environment from identified risks. The transition to more 
collaborative decision-making frameworks can also be applied to current 
regulatory bottlenecks such as the introduction of negotiated sustainable 
remediation technologies as an addition or substitute to traditional pump-
and-treat approaches in hazardous waste management. Another example 
is the mandatory phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons through the international 
Montreal Protocol process that is combined with the voluntary initiative taken 
by the Consumer Goods Forum (a global organization of major consumer 
goods and retail companies) to accelerate the phase-out of key ozone de-
pleting and/or greenhouse gases.
18 For a discussion of these and other issues involved in greater scale collaboration, see, Terry F. Yosie, “How Collaboration Creates 
Value and Accelerates Change,” in www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/04/29/how-collaboration-creates-value-and-accelerates-
change.
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However, as the scale of global economic activities accelerates, and as sus-
tainability challenges transcend multiple boundaries, new policy frameworks 
are needed. There are several critical areas where regulatory policies need to 
be rethought if governments and their stakeholders are to effectively respond 
to and prevent global-scale risks. These elements include:
• Policymakers should invite as observers or contributors those experts from 
business or NGOs who have expertise and have engaged in designing and 
implementing approaches previously described. Those who are familiar 
with the processes necessary for creating new collaboration strategies can 
provide valuable and practical insights to establish policy frameworks that 
are more suited to the challenges posed by system-level risks.
• Policies should embody a ‘systems’ approach to effectively assess and 
manage risks. The examples cited previously provide evidence of various 
efforts that are underway to build policy frameworks and capacities. 
They need to be expanded and accelerated across a host of system-
level problems.
• More emphasis should be placed on the development and use of integrated 
tools and methodologies to aid policymakers, business managers and 
others charged with evaluating and reducing risks.19
• Policymakers should work to transition from the regulation of individual 
pollution sources and sectors to the design and implementation of 
regulatory frameworks for entire value chains. Regulatory agencies such as 
EPA and the US Food and Drug Administration have developed processes 
and accumulated experiences to make this transition. They and other 
agencies need to accelerate planning to keep pace with sustainability 
impacts in the marketplace.
• Regulatory policies need to be guided by the insights provided by smart 
technologies and data analytics to discern key trends and opportunities 
for policy interventions. Greater investments in policy analysis that embody 
data analytics and expanded partnerships with the private sector are 
pathways towards this outcome.
• The co-benefits of reducing system-level risks (e.g., the additional public 
health benefits that accrue by reducing ambient particulate matter through 
the control of greenhouse gases or the adoption of energy efficiency 
measures) should be identified and communicated in a more transparent 
manner with key stakeholders.20
• Regulatory agencies should develop more formal plans to identify and 
recruit the critical skills and competencies necessary to evaluate and 
manage system-level risks.
In considering these elements, there are two additional factors that are im-
portant to keep in mind: 1) public agencies (regulators) possess important 
convening authorities to assemble the requisite data and stakeholders and, 
where appropriate, effective and legal, they should consider directly facili-
tating processes aimed at resolving system-level risks; and 2) the range of 
19 US National Research Council, Sustainability Concepts in Decision Making, cited above, is a good start in identifying and evalu-
ating the utility of a variety of tools, methods and forms of collaboration between regulators and affected parties, for a variety of 
sustainability-related challenges.
20 A series of co-benefit examples can be found in US EPA (2015), Climate Change in the United States: Benefits of Global Action: 
Office of Atmospheric Programs, EPA 430-R-15-001.
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governance options for system-level risks will continue to expand and will 
range from traditional command and control regulation, voluntary initiatives, 
expanded reporting, to ultimately shared forms of governance that are co-de-
signed and implemented by government authorities, regulated entities and 
non-governmental organizations. Such creativity should be encouraged not 
only to enhance problem-solving but also to build trust among stakeholder 
organizations and the public and attempt to de-politicize risk governance 
without forgetting the importance of designing and maintaining sufficient 
provisions for transparency and improved performance. 
As additional experience is gained with system-level risk governance alter-
natives, it will be important to develop practical guidelines, or suggested 
typologies, that further delineate the capabilities, roles and responsibilities 
of regulatory agencies, the private sector, NGOs and the affected publics to 
better answer such basic questions as “who is responsible for doing what?”.
Conclusion
As the understanding of emerging risks grows and stimulates additional think-
ing on the design and implementation of system-level solutions, inevitably, 
new roles and responsibilities for regulatory agencies, private sector and 
non-governmental organizations will also arise. Respectively, their evolving 
roles and relationships will continue to depend on the implementation of 
tasks where they currently maintain core competencies – e.g., to develop 
and enforce essential public health and environmental protection, improve 
living standards by creating additional wealth, and provide essential oversight 
and advocacy for major societal needs. Just as importantly, these and other 
institutions need to branch out, simultaneously developing additional capabil-
ities and collaborative approaches to resolve planetary-wide challenges that 
are beyond their individual capacities. While the need for such a transition 
is beginning to be recognized, the unresolved question is whether or not it 
can be successful in a sufficiently timely fashion.

43 ////
POTENTIAL SCOPE AND 
CHALLENGES OF BEHAVIOURALLY 
INFORMED REGULATION   
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN 
REGULATORY RISK MANAGEMENT
Introduction
This paper looks at how behavioural sciences and the relevant knowledge can 
be applied by public authorities to design, test and implement interventions 
that help society and consumers make choices that are both sustainable 
and to their well-being while remaining compatible with legitimate collective 
decision-making. Used in the context of comprehensive risk governance, 
behavioural insight (here abbreviated as BI) is valuable and useful in helping 
define a problem in the first instance and providing an understanding of 
the risks and shortfalls before any designing regulation even begins. More 
specifically, this paper addresses the possibility of intervening in individual 
or group behaviour, and discusses effectiveness and legality. The legitimacy 
of such interventions is derived from the overall governance process that 
recommends a democratic and inclusive selection rule for choosing a spe-
cific transformation path over other alternatives. If such a legitimate decision 
has been made, then it is morally and politically justified for collective actors 
to shape human behaviour through interventions. However, it is essential 
that such approaches are fully transparent and open to public scrutiny and 
critique.
The literature on shaping human behaviour describes five generic intervention 
strategies: direct legal prescriptions (laws); economic incentives (subsidies, 
certificates, taxes, tariffs); informational and educational material (labelling, 
certification, training, communication); influencing choice architecture (‘nudg-
ing’) and changing institutional contexts (facilitating or impeding specific 
behavioural options). Each scientific community has established its own 
methods and published dedicated scientific journals. There is a fair degree of 
competition between the communities as far as the relevance for explaining 
people’s behaviour is concerned and the legitimacy of each approach with 
respect to democratic or ethical principles. It is important to bridge the gaps 
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between these communities and to consider all five intervention methods as 
appropriate and effective depending on the context and situation. No one 
method should be favoured over another. The respective potential of each 
needs to be defined together with its limits and drawbacks, while emphasis- 
ing that effective behavioural change is most likely to be achieved through 
a combination of interventions.
There is much interest in choice architecture as a type of intervention that 
is complementary to others such as information and educational material, 
economic incentives, or contextual and institutional changes. Direct legal 
prescriptions will not be discussed in this paper as most analysts agree that 
this is more or less a last resort when any other (more voluntary) incentive fails 
or is inappropriate. Indeed, in certain circumstances direct legal prescriptions 
are required and constitute the correct form of intervention. In this case, be-
havioural scientists can provide insights on their implementation. However, 
many of the other interventions depend, at least to a certain extent, on the 
legal framework allowing these interventions to become effective. Finally, all 
five intervention options have to be seen as partially complimentary and par-
tially substitutive. The most interesting aspect with respect to transformative 
science (see Box 1) is the effect that various combinations of all intervention 
strategies and their potential interactions have jointly. 
Transformative science involves new and innovative ap-
proaches to generating and using scientific expertise in 
policymaking. This is often required when public authorities 
need to encourage new types of well-being or development. 
Transformation requires a three-step scientific process of 
knowledge production and transfer. The first step is to develop 
knowledge of systemic interactions between scientific and 
technological development, organisational changes, gov-
ernance structures and human behaviour. Human actions 
are considered to be the main current drivers of natural and 
cultural evolution. The new role of society as co-creator of 
evolution necessitates a better and more intimate understand-
ing of the interconnections between nature, technology and 
society. By investigating the systemic connections between 
these three major elements, systems knowledge is created. 
Such systemic knowledge is needed to understand a system 
as a whole before one attempts to change it.
The second stage in knowledge generation and utilisation is 
the creation of orientation science. Orientation implies pro-
viding guidance about the goals or objectives one intends 
to achieve. This requires both knowledge about the likely 
outcome of taking one option as opposed to another and 
understanding how desirable or ethical the consequences of 
each option will be seen by decision-makers and the public 
concerned. Hence, this step includes two major objectives. 
The first is to develop a normative framework for the objec-
tives and goals (of sustainability) that human interventions into 
Box 1: Transformative science
the network of technology, nature and society are to pursue. 
Sustainability is a deeply normative concept that needs to 
be specified in terms of medium and long-term objectives, 
including the selected endpoints of development and the 
legitimate means and instruments necessary to reach these 
goals. In line with the aim of IRGC to help develop inclusive 
governance, this normative exercise requires input from var-
ious stakeholders, plural publics and individuals concerned. 
The second aspect of orientation is to develop scenarios that 
help understand the transitions that are necessary to reach 
the normative goals that have been negotiated through partic-
ipatory processes. These scenarios help decision-makers, as 
well as the populations affected, to understand the necessary 
trade-offs between conflicting goals and to understand the 
potential risks and side effects that are associated with each 
scenario.1
The third and final step is to design, implement and test 
interventions that can help guide society into following the 
general direction that the most favoured scenario suggests. 
These interventions are, in an ideal case, enlightened by the 
consensus that this specific scenario is to be preferred over 
a set of alternative scenarios. They also require a govern-
ance process that is able to facilitate the transition towards 
the implementation of this preferred scenario. The main goal 
here is to define, investigate and monitor policy interventions 
according to the main evaluative criteria such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, fairness and resilience. 
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Interventions based on insights gathered from BI are expected to improve 
social well-being by changing the way policy is being designed and imple-
mented, in combination with economic incentives, context variation and 
regulatory measures, i.e. public authority prescriptions. This paper reviews the 
overall scope and challenges of interventions directed at changing individual 
behaviour. The starting point and rationale for this paper results from the gaps 
in regulatory efficacy and efficiency. Questions that regulators are invited to 
consider include: How can behavioural sciences help improve regulatory 
effectiveness? Can regulators influence fundamental and lasting behaviour 
change? What can they do when industry reacts in sectors where freedom 
of consumption choice is protected by law? Can public intervention based 
on behavioural insights substitute, or complement regulation? Is it always 
legal or ethical? If not, how can it be made legal and ethical?
This paper is organised into four sections. Section 1 looks at the contribu-
tion of behavioural sciences to risk governance where national authorities 
are concerned. Section 2 discusses the scope of application of behavioural 
insights. Section 3 looks at the challenges: issues of effectiveness, legality 
and acceptability. Section 4 proposes general recommendations for imple-
mentation. Additional references and notes have also been provided for 
further reading on specific topics.
1. Contribution of behavioural 
sciences to risk governance
The work of social scientists is to understand and interpret human decisions 
and actions. It can explain people’s behaviour with regard to activities that 
incur risks, whether to themselves or to others. Peer-to-peer persuasion and 
using subconscious factors or other such emotionally driven interventions 
can be valuable approaches for managing risk.
1.1 
Behavioural sciences
Behavioural sciences study human behaviour. Scholars in this field are re-
searching the motives and drivers behind people’s behaviour and, based on 
these insights, looking for relevant opportunities and limitations of influence. 
Their interest is in designing interventions and policies in ways that are cog-
nisant of and informed by insights of empirical behaviour observation.
• Behavioural economists recognise that people do not act merely out of 
self-interest or strict cost-benefit analyses. They stress the importance of 
symbolic (suggesting positive ideas or qualities) or monetary incentives 
for sustaining or changing behaviour.
• Behavioural psychologists are interested in studying human behaviour that 
is often conditioned by routines and tradition. They stress the importance 
of both salient information and choice architecture to make people more 
cognisant and ready to change their behaviour.
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• Behavioural social scientists stress the importance of context factors 
and institutional constraints such as social recognition; social norms; and 
situational constraints that shape the conditions for individuals considering 
or choosing alternative options for their own actions.
Especially in view of the prevalence of heterogeneous consumer segments, 
for example in the energy sector − a new field of interest, it is essential to 
integrate these three traditions in behavioural research if final energy con-
sumption is to be modified in line with energy policy objectives.2 
Psychology and other social sciences offer new insights that help regulators 
ameliorate the effectiveness of the economic instruments governments use 
in their broad regulatory function. This includes those to remedy market fail-
ures, redistribute income, and collect tax revenue. Some generic findings of 
behavioural sciences are useful for policy makers and regulators. For example, 
people work with ‘mental models’ 3 as their psychological representations of 
real, hypothetical, or imaginary situations. This helps them anticipate events, 
reason, decide and provide explanation. Mental models may not be accurate 
or scientific representations of reality. They are influenced by a number of 
factors, including social norms 4, i.e. unwritten rules about how people behave 
in social contexts at a particular time or ‘decision point’. The existence of 
social norms explains that peer-pressure is important in triggering change. 
What others think, expect and do influences our preferences and decisions. 
However, different people may have varying reasons or motives for their be-
haviour (beyond their opinion or attitude). There are various types of rationality, 
which behavioural scientists aim to explore, understand and analyse, often 
with a view to provide recommendations for intervention.
The concepts of ‘expected’ utility, symbolic gratification and a multitude of 
subjective rationalities, rather than a single instrumental rationality, are cen-
tral to this debate. Theoreticians will explain why certain behaviour seems 
irrational, according to the classic economic theory (that people tend to 
maximise their profit), and behavioural economists have greatly contributed 
in sharing the understanding that what may not appear ‘rational’, according 
to the principle of maximising utility, may in fact be rational with respect to 
the objectives of the decider in the light of his or her own logic. For example, 
following social norms is a rational behaviour in its own domain, although 
this may not lead to perfect economic optimisation.
1.2 
Cognitive biases
Behavioural insights can be extremely useful in understanding the predis-
positions that affect how people take decisions and then build on those 
biases to help obtain a better outcome. Biases and intuitive heuristics relate 
to processing information on risk aspects such as exposure, probability or 
uncertainty. Biases that individuals often apply to judge risks or to draw 
inferences from probabilistic information 5 include 6:
• Availability: Events that come to people's mind immediately (e.g. events 
highlighted in the mass media) are rated as more probable than events that 
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are less in their thoughts. In food consumption behaviour, if people have 
a tendency to grab the first food they see (due to the availability heuristic 
or satisficing choice strategies), then it is recommended that they see the 
healthy food first. 
• Status quo or choice avoidance: people have a tendency not to change 
their behaviour. If their inclination is to stick with the default retirement 
plan that is proposed to them, then authorities need to make sure that the 
default retirement plan is the one that is best for them.
• Anchoring effect: Probabilities are not adjusted sufficiently taking into 
account new information when it becomes available. People retain the 
perceived significance of the initial information so that, for example, if 
they associate eating fish with heavy metal contamination, they are likely 
to ignore that eating fish, even lightly contaminated, is still healthier than 
eating red meat. 
• Personal experience: Single events either experienced directly by people, 
or in associated circumstances, are considered more typical than the 
information related to the actual frequencies of those events. People who, 
by chance, have observed that woman drivers were involved in the last 
two accidents they witnessed are likely to infer that women cause more 
accidents (which, in fact, is not true).
• Avoidance of cognitive dissonance: In an attempt to attenuate cognitive 
dissonance, information which challenges perceived probabilities that are 
already part of a belief system will either be ignored or minimised, in an 
attempt to attenuate cognitive dissonance. Autonomous cars are perceived 
to be less safe than others because the overriding belief is that humans 
are better drivers than machines, even though experts demonstrate that, 
in general, machines cause fewer accidents than humans. In the case of 
autonomous vehicles, industry and regulators will need to campaign more 
to explain why they can be safer than conventional ones. 
1.3 
Use of behavioural sciences in governmental organisations
Behavioural sciences involve a new type of systemic thinking about old prob-
lems, especially when there are difficult trade-offs to be made such as those 
involving freedom and privacy or efficacy and efficiency. Indeed, interventions 
based on behavioural insights require embeddedness in appropriate political 
agendas and support. According to the reckoning of certain leading interna-
tional organisations however, these interventions are worth the effort it takes 
to make them work effectively and legally. In their guide for policy-makers 
entitled “Applying behavioural sciences to EU policy making”, the European 
Commission concluded that “well-designed behavioural studies can offer use-
ful insights to policy-makers by generating the evidence required to improve 
policies”7. Back in 2010, the OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit 8 (a roadmap 
for policy choices) recommended governments consider studies by social 
scientists. The OECD provided further endorsements in a 2014 publication, 
“Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics”, which included a review 
of numerous country trials 9. The World Bank also demonstrated its interest 
in tools to help advance a new set of development approaches based on a 
fuller consideration of psychological and social influences 10.
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In governments, interest in BI goes in pair with a desire to change public 
authority culture and regulation. Vocabulary used includes ‘team’ in the UK 11, 
‘initiative’ in the US 12 or ‘network’ 
in the Netherlands 13 (to foster the 
impression of an operating net of var-
ious department teams), terms that 
are not frequently associated with 
public administration. Communica-
tion is aimed at people on a personal 
level (e.g. ‘you and your neighbours’). 
Beyond improving the performance 
of regulatory effectiveness and trig-
gering individual behaviour, this 
approach demonstrates a sense of 
individual responsibility toward risk 
(which is expected to result in reduc-
ing the burden of risk management 
costs on governments). The aim is 
to develop a new way of enhancing 
mutual trust between authorities and 
citizens.
1.4 
Use of behavioural sciences  
in the broad context of risk governance
Risk governance implies taking a holistic approach to assessment and man-
agement. It requires: careful scientific appraisal and weighing how people 
perceive risk; evaluating the acceptability of risk in order to decide whether 
or not, as well as how, risk needs to be managed in a particular context; 
considering various management options before selecting a single one or 
several; and, finally, placing risk communication at the centre of the process. 
The whole process aims to establish dialogue, transparency and confidence. 
Figure 1 illustrates the IRGC risk governance framework 14 (IRGC, 2005). 
Risk governance takes a multi-disciplinary approach aimed at including all 
stakeholders in the management decision about the risk issue. Knowledge 
gained from behavioural sciences is thus useful at various stages in the 
process and can contribute to its success:
• By helping develop a more complex but complete picture of the risk at 
hand and understanding the importance of frames when risk problems are 
defined in a pluralistic society. Framing provides an image of the problem 
which explains the expectations that different groups and individuals 
associate with a risk.
• As a source of information for assessing concern as an integral part of 
the risk appraisal: Concerns underlie the behavioural responses of people 
when making judgements about risks and their impacts. Concerns do not 
determine behavioural reactions but do influence them.
• For making trade-offs when evaluating tolerability or the acceptability 
of a risk. Trade-offs are manifestations of people’s preferences and 
Figure 1: IRGC risk governance 
framework
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values. Regulatory trade-offs may or may not coincide with individual or 
group-preferences. If the gap between public and individual trade-offs is 
particularly broad, one can expect protest movements or civil disobedience. 
• For evaluating various risk management options aimed at dealing with 
the source of the risk or its impact on the parties affected and the 
consequences. For example, for risk matters that are not regulated by 
law, insurance companies involved in developing risk transfer mechanisms 
are segmenting their client base using behaviour (such as smoking or the 
regular practice of a physical activity) as a determinant of coverage or 
pricing conditions.
2. Scope of the application of behavioural insights 
For risk management there are three broad types of application where BI 
can improve the effectiveness of public intervention: implementing regula-
tion, changing behaviour beyond the scope of regulation and changing the 
design of regulation 15.
2.1 
Implementing regulation 
Improving regulatory implementation, thus refining compliance with laws and 
regulation, is the first objective of those governments applying BI. Examples 
include making people pay their taxes on time, or recycling waste in an ap-
propriate manner. The aim is to improve the effectiveness of regulation and 
its cost efficiency 16. BI helps regulators implement and enforce regulation in 
a way that corresponds well with people's spontaneous behaviour. Those 
who enforce regulation will help those who are regulated to comply with 
specific requirements, by demonstrating how it is (or could be) to their ben-
efit, instead of blaming or punishing them. The OECD report on “Regulatory 
Policy and Behavioural Economics” 17 provides numerous examples of how 
applying behavioural economics to policy can improve regulatory delivery, 
interpretation and enforcement of existing rules, as well as regulatory design. 
We cite two here:
• Several countries have followed the successful work carried out in the 
UK to increase tax compliance. They undertook random controlled trials 
to assess the impact of various forms of communication – in particular 
letters that were sent to noncompliant individuals and businesses – to 
increase the repayment rate of taxes that were overdue. Some of the 
lessons learned from studying the effectiveness of various messages 
show that personalising letters is needed, for example by harnessing the 
power of social norms and drawing comparison with other taxpayers in the 
neighbourhood (if the average compliance is higher), or making it extremely 
simple to pay taxes in time. A first trial boosted repayment rates by up to 
15% in the first 6 weeks 18.
• Another example where regulatory enforcement can be improved is that 
carried out by the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the UK 
Financial Conduct Authority. They recruited behavioural scientists to assist 
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their own managerial staff, for example in investigating a potential breach 
of regulation or action that could be detrimental to the consumer. These 
agencies expect this will help them improve company understanding of 
observed behaviours and enable managers to form better judgements.
2.2 
Changing behaviour in a non-regulated field 
This second type of application applies to cases where there is no regulation. 
It involves decision-making, helping people decide and behave in a manner 
that is less risky to themselves and society. This field is noticeable in that it 
helps people improve their own individual risk management without sacri-
ficing welfare. It aims to reinforce personal decisions on various aspects of 
living where risk is involved. The major constraint in these approaches is that 
individuals need to remain free to take their own decisions. In other words, 
they cannot be forced into certain choices but retain freedom of choice, both 
democratically and ethically.
Governments can deploy techniques that influence consumer choice, often 
without their being aware, i.e. when consumers are not made explicitly aware 
of the desirable choice (for example, pre-checked boxes in questionnaires 
about saving for retirement that prompt employees towards a ‘default option’, 
one which prefers long-term savings over short-term consumption). This can 
also help people reach their own objectives.
BI can be used in many ways and there are positive experiences in various 
fields such as:
• Public health, for example to suggest healthier foods. “5 A DAY” fruit and 
vegetable campaigns have been instigated by many governments 19. 
• Pension coverage, for example in countries where compulsory schemes 
provide insufficient pensions, to encourage people to save for their 
retirement in addition to compulsory schemes. Employers and voluntary 
insurance schemes propose automatic pension admission, in which 
employees need to check a box if they do not want to enrol. In the US, 
this small change appears to have boosted savings by over to 40% 20. The 
“Kiwisaver” auto-enrolment scheme in New Zealand (2007) led to a 50% 
pension coverage increase. This type of nudging is based on the fact that 
behaviour tends to be driven by relying on default options, by myopic 
attitudes or by habit.
• Organ donation: a study across 22 countries and over 10 years indicates 
that actual organ donation rates are 25 to 30% higher in presumed-consent 
countries than in informed-consent countries. This analysis has triggered 
a switch from informed to presumed consent in many countries 21.
In addition to the fields of finance, health, food and, to a certain extent to-
bacco and energy efficiency, there are many other sectors that could benefit 
from BI insights. These include energy behaviour, nutrition, exercise, drug 
abuse and many others. Applications might include the triggering of individual 
commitment and actions towards climate change mitigation; stimulating a 
positive change with regards to reduction of exposure and vulnerability to 
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natural hazards (insofar as exposure and vulnerability result from individual 
decisions and choices); or activating data protection and privacy (in order 
to reduce the spread of cyber security risk). Development policy bodies and 
developing countries are also implementing behavioural insights 22. 
2.3 
Changing the design of regulation
When the root causes of individual and collective behavioural decisions and 
the feedback effect of deliberate interventions to change people’s behaviour 
are well analysed and understood, regulators can consider using insights from 
behavioural sciences to design new or re-design existing regulations, i.e. as 
a means of selecting one type of intervention over another. For example, 
where command and control regulation does not work, an incentive-based 
instrument might be preferred. The cyber world, for example, is a possible 
new field for regulators where individual behaviour to prevent or stop mali-
cious intrusion will need to be better understood, before creating new rules. 
Empirical analysis of how people use (or not) passwords and anti-virus soft-
ware should guide administrators and regulators on how to design security 
within the systems, rather than by imposing external constraints that many 
people try to bypass. Also, motivation and behavioural patterns of cyber 
attackers need to be better understood to improve threat assessment and 
design standards for safer Internet design.
An interesting example is that of the trend to deregulate electricity markets. 
In deregulated electricity markets consumers can choose their suppliers and 
often their pricing schemes. Providing them with a choice potentially creates 
new risks if competition is too fierce. In fact, findings from some regulators 
have shown that too much choice is damaging, in that it creates consumer 
confusion and inertia. Thus regulators need, in parallel, to produce new types 
of indirect measures that serve the goal of regulation intended, for example 
showing how energy suppliers can market their products. 
It is clear that insights from behavioural sciences can be used to support new 
thinking on relations between various levels and types of governance and 
regulation. As explained by other authors in this publication, the attitude of 
public and private actors with regards to regulation are changing.
Conclusions
The three fields of application (regulation implementation, behaviour change 
beyond the scope of regulation and regulation design change) benefit from 
the findings of behavioural sciences. However, there are certain differences. 
In particular, the question of creating an appropriate choice architecture, or 
nudging to induce a change of behaviour that is in the interest of individu-
als and society is specific to the second type of application. It is here that 
opposition is more active, and opponents claim that governments may go 
into so-called ‘soft-paternalism’, a governance style that some governments 
may avoid. 
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Nudging was first described in 2008 by Thaler and Sunstein 23 as a soft and 
liberal way to achieve policy outcome – a contrast to command-and-order 
instruments. It comprises a set of tools that governments and regulators 
can consider using when they face serious problems or risks either caused 
by citizens or affecting citizens, and which the usual regulatory instruments 
fail to address. For example, people continue to die from smoking; obesity 
is still increasing; unemployment affects primarily poor people and govern-
ments do not know how they will finance retirement pensions in the future. 
Nudging is only one facet of BI and related to the choice architecture that 
is provided to people by regulatory bodies or other authorities. It offers an 
alternative to command-and-control regulation since it retains the factor of 
choice. But it requires appropriate checking, control and restriction on how it 
is used. Nudging can be used in combination or as an alternative to economic 
incentives or educational/communication tools.
3. Challenges: how to make it work; 
is it legal, acceptable?
Early applications of behavioural insights, particularly in designing inter-
ventions that aim to nudge people into taking certain decisions or adopting 
specific behaviour, have raised concern about their effectiveness and legality 
(especially where ethical acceptability beyond legal prescriptions is con-
cerned). In addition, industry and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
may be opposed to nudging since it relies on a form of paternalism that 
shapes people’s behaviour in a specific direction, often without their even 
noticing let alone approving. This section reviews some of the questions and 
lessons gleaned from experience and the opinion of experts.
3.1 
Effectiveness
The first issue concerns effectiveness. Is the performance of public interven-
tions specifically designed using BI superior to a monetary incentive system 
that aims for the same result? 
The characteristics of effective behaviour-informed interventions are in a way 
similar to those of marketing instruments used in the private sector. Social 
marketing has been used by philanthropic or humanitarian organisations, and 
governments can learn from their experience. There are positive outcomes 
in many countries. With regard to regulatory implementation and design, it is 
obvious that a better understanding of how those regulated actually behave 
improves impact and efficiency. 
When it comes to modifying consumer behaviour, studies indicate that these 
interventions are more effective when people are unaware that some ‘hidden’ 
persuasion is built into the proposals that are being made to them; when 
complexity is simplified and decision appears to be ‘simple’; or when social 
norms and group pressure are brought to the front to trigger a certain change. 
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In order to be effective, tools that influence behaviour and present people with 
choices must also carefully structure the task of the choice, i.e. determine 
what information is supplied, and then describe the choice options, presenting 
them in an attractive manner 24. However, the question remains as to whether 
such interventions, even if effective in the first place, continue to work after 
a first initial period of interest or even enthusiasm. Experience here has been 
diverse. For example, communication to improve energy efficiency or savings 
(through reduction of energy bills) seems to lose its attractiveness as time 
passes, probably because of the large price elasticity 25. The time horizon is an 
important factor in gauging the effectiveness of nudges. So, policy-makers, 
regulators and behavioural scientists need to continue to work together and 
learn from each other. Experience of using placebos in the medical sector 
can be useful: placebos can work when people are unaware of them, but 
they pose ethical issues concerning prior consent.
Another dimension worth mentioning is that of interventions that can be ef-
fective for some population segments and not for others. Interventions need 
to be tested with a targeted audience before being deployed.
3.2 
Legality and legitimacy
A second, important question that legislators have to consider is whether the 
application of behavioural insights to trigger certain decisions or behaviour 
changes is always entirely legal and legitimate. This specifically concerns 
regulators who might consider developing a regulatory context and condi-
tions in order to ‘host’ interventions to change people’s behaviours. In liberal 
states, special legal problems can arise. These include constitutional limits 26. 
There are institutional mechanisms and features – such as the principles of 
legality, impartiality and judicial oversight 27, which ensure that laws respect 
fundamental rights such as equality of treatment, fairness, freedom of choice 
and expression, and privacy. But if governments use instruments other than 
laws or regulation, it is possible they extend beyond what citizens want or 
expect in a democratic regime and is largely dependent on the amount of trust 
they have in their government. The question of whether and when nudging 
is a legitimate and acceptable approach is thus important.
Scholars who work on this debate have compared nudging to ‘soft-pater-
nalism’ or ‘patronising’ and there is much questioning as to whether or not 
this is acceptable and desirable 28. According to some, nudging goes against 
empowerment, freedom and fairness 29. Those who claim that soft-paternal-
ism is unacceptable have identified three issues. One is that it is based on 
a subjective evaluation of what is in the best interest of a person. Another is 
that it does not help individuals build their own autonomy. Finally, it neglects 
the dynamic feedback effects of behaviourally-informed policy interventions 30. 
Those who admit that it is, or can be, legal and acceptable note that guid-
ing individuals through various possible choices is often unavoidable, and 
therefore cannot morally be inherently problematic. Thus, when it is impos-
sible to avoid shaping people’s choices, some forms of behaviour change 
have to be permissible 31. However, there are three main requirements. The 
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first is that all citizens should be treated equally. Nudging should not cause 
any form of discrimination between those who behave as regulators wish 
them to behave, and those who do not. The second is that interventions are 
designed or implemented using a choice-preserving approach. Freedom of 
choice (self-determination) must be maintained, even if it implies increased 
individual or public risk, or if it means that decisions will not be optimised. 
Finally, autonomy also needs to be retained. Nudging should not be consid-
ered as a manifestation of the exercise of public power.
Often, legitimacy is attributed to a collective process by which the goal and 
the means to reach these goals are approved by democratic deliberative 
decision-making or participatory processes. The practice of nudging needs 
to be supervised by a democratically elected body which ensures that inter-
ventions and choice framing do not prevent or compromise individual choices. 
The common good needs to be substantiated by a relevant process but not 
approved by each individual involved.
The concerns reviewed here should be understood to be cautionary consid-
erations. Dialogue between those who design nudge interventions and those 
who critique them needs to be formalised 32 and frameworks developed for 
the responsible use of behaviour-informed regulations can be developed 33. 
Also, such strategies need to be evaluated according to whatever regulatory 
instruments can ensure they are publicly checked and controlled 34. Alemanno 
and Spina (2014) suggest that a legal framework be developed to ensure that 
the benefits of behavioural insights are able to inform regulatory processes 
in a way such that citizens’ rights and freedom are guaranteed.
3.3 
Industry and NGOs may be opposed  
to nudging by public authorities
A related issue that should be mentioned here is the role played by com-
mercial players and NGOs. Increasingly these have an impact on consumer 
behaviour and regulators have to develop new, more appropriate ways to 
respond, rather than simply deciding on standards, norms or bans, when 
issues of security or safety are at stake. When evidence concerning safety, 
security or environmental sustainability issues is contested, relying on that 
evidence, or the common good, can no longer be sufficient. For example, it 
would be extremely useful if behavioural insights were able to help re-design 
traditional policies such as those on tobacco, obesity or antimicrobial resist-
ance, where most current policies fail to deal with the risk in a satisfactory 
manner. With these three examples in mind, it is not difficult to imagine that, 
if governments massively engaged in successful nudging, and in the absence 
of a deliberative process that determines what people want, industry would 
be an opponent and argue that freedom of choice should be preserved. 
Using behavioural insights will perhaps not make policies more acceptable 
to industry, especially if it makes the policies more acceptable to people. 
There is an active debate on the topic of labelling. For example, so-called 
‘traffic light’ labelling 35 where, for example, a red sticker implies that “this 
product is not good for you” and a green sticker translates as “this one is 
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good for you”, can be attractive to people and efficient in influencing customer 
choice. But this type of labelling needs to be acceptable to regulators as well 
as industry. The latter is able to work around constraints such as disclosure 
requirements imposed by efficient labelling. 
There is opposition in industry and we can anticipate that, for example, if 
regulators were to consider regulating product layout in supermarkets and 
cafeterias (so that healthy products were placed at eye level, and less healthy 
products at higher or lower display levels) they would face industry opposi-
tion, both from retailers and producers. In 2012, New York Mayor Bloomberg, 
proposed a ban on the sale of soft drinks in large cups in public places. 
The ban was inspired by empirical findings from behavioural scientists and, 
on that basis, justified as one of the measures, among others, in the fight 
against obesity and diabetes. The ban was approved by the New York City 
Board of Health and later countered in court. Many people were outraged by 
what they thought was an illegitimate reduction of their freedom of choice 36. 
Like nudging people to quit smoking, interventions to help people change 
their behaviour need to be based on what people really want. Therefore, as 
suggested in the introduction and Box 1, interventions based on behavioural 
insights need to be a part of democratic and inclusive governance.
4. Concluding remarks 
Elaborating on considerations of effectiveness and legality, this section pro-
poses a form of roadmap and key recommendations for regulators who are 
considering applying behavioural insights. 
Setting and achieving the objective 
Regulators who decide to apply BI begin by defining the objective of their 
decision to do so. This entails identifying what it is that has to be improved 
in risk regulation or management. They can begin by asking the following 
questions: what is wrong with the current regulation and how is it imple-
mented? Are existing risk reduction measures both effective and efficient? 
Regulators then invite those who are affected by the regulation to think about 
their own objectives and motivation: what matters to them? What do they 
really want? Those who are concerned by a regulation will react more pos-
itively if they recognise that in doing what the regulators suggest it will help 
them reach their own personal objectives. The process by which regulators 
assist the regulated in revealing their personal objectives is necessary to every 
successful intervention. For example, risk managers in finance departments 
are faced with the financial risks related to aging populations, of being able 
to pay retirement pensions in the future. They aim to transfer some of this 
risk to individuals, and experiment with ways to trigger greater individual 
savings. Providing concrete examples of the additional welfare that people 
would receive after retirement if they increased their saving now, provides a 
positive incentive to save money for the future.
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Working to assess and understand, before managing
Like in a risk management process, regulatory interventions based on be-
havioural insights begin with an assessment of people’s actual needs and 
perception of their actions, their present behaviour and the risks involved, 
the benefits associated with the activity, and the benefits associated with a 
behaviour change. In general, people need to perceive a risk before they are 
willing to change their behaviour with regard to the activity causing the risk. 
Only after a careful analysis of people’s motivations, attitudes and behaviour 
can the management phase begin. 
When communicating the implementation of a government intervention, it is 
important to place the user at the centre. He/she, as a citizen or consumer, is 
the subject, not the object. Users must be involved in the discussion about 
their behaviour. They become instrumental in their own regulation 37.
In the field of law enforcement, an intervention decided on the basis of BI 
should not be intended as either substituting or complementing a law or reg-
ulation. Instead, it will aim to assist people in doing what they are obliged to 
do (such as paying taxes) or what is good for their own health or well-being 
(such as avoiding overweight). In 2014 the City of Philadelphia carried out 
an experiment to improve compliance with city regulations on littering and 
waste recycling. In order to improve law enforcement, it was decided not to 
blame and fine people in poor neighbourhoods, but to announce publicly 
that city staff would be coming to inspect the streets. This resulted in the 
streets being cleaned before they arrived. This approach neither substitutes 
nor complements the law, it assists citizens in doing what they have to do, 
piloting and focusing on outcome.
Testing and experimenting
Most prescriptions and communication messages need to be tested before 
being implemented, to gain knowledge about how people really behave. For 
example, it was found that people did not know how to wash their hands in 
order to eliminate the flu virus and avoid contamination during outbreaks. 
Communication campaigns on washing one’s hands were thus ineffective 
until they included clear instructions on how to go about this. It is extremely 
important to evaluate how communication campaigns are understood before 
they are deployed. Even if communication appears obvious, certain segments 
of the population may understand it differently to others. People behave 
differently in different cultures and situations.
Practitioners have learned, and continue to learn, how to test ideas and 
communication messages before they implement them. Too often it is a 
poor understanding of those individuals who are targeted in a campaign that 
explains the difference between an expected ‘rational’ behaviour and the 
actual behaviour. Public services need to learn that testing is necessary, and 
regulators might consider including this requirement in legislation (ex-ante 
impact assessment) in addition to ex-post impact assessment. In this sense, 
random field trials have proven to be successful in evaluating the effective-
ness of public policy intervention 38. However after a few years of testing in 
various countries and with differing population segments, there are some 
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cases when testing is no longer necessary because sufficient knowledge 
has been collected.
Major recommendations
Analysis of trials so far have led to three generic recommendations as to how 
governments can use behavioural insights to improve regulatory impact and 
effectiveness 39:
1. Make it simple, easy, attractive, timely and social for people to make 
choices or change their behaviour to their benefit and harmlessly. This 
helps individuals deal better with complexity. 
2. Make the relevant option more salient and provide default options where 
appropriate (but not always, as there may be some perverse effects as 
well); require active participation to opt out – as opposed to not opting 
in, of the more beneficial option – that is the one that will be applied if 
the individual does not choose any specific one. This helps individuals 
deal better with uncertainty and inter-temporal decision-making. Default 
options have been widely studied by scholars and practitioners 40. 
3. Respect freedom of choice. ‘Opting out’ must always be possible and 
should be proposed while ensuring that individuals can build on their own 
autonomy, in particular where future choices are concerned.
These three recommendations also demonstrate the difficult trade-offs that 
regulators face in their task of helping people take better decisions. The case 
of Internet websites is exemplary: on the one hand, ‘pre-checked’ boxes 
are used widely to make decision-taking easier and the ‘right’ option more 
salient. On the other hand, human inertia, framing and a bias towards the 
status quo need to be taken into account, and this should limit the use of 
pre-checked boxes 41. For example, under EU law, pre-checking the travel 
insurance box is not illegal.
The current attention being paid to how BI can be integrated in regulation 
focuses on disclosure requirements such as regulatory tools, default rules, 
and simplification 42. 
Sharing information between scientists and practitioners,  
and between countries
The OECD and others have set up a repository to share the experience and 
practice of others, their knowledge and design metrics, to provide bench-
marks and a source of learning. For example, it is useful to know which 
common themes, such as ‘make it simple’, or ‘set the preferred option as 
the default option’, work in most contexts and settings, and what type of 
variation can be expected. Such a repository will help countries improve their 
learning curve and benefit from the experience of others. The aim is to create 
an ecosystem in which various stakeholders from differing cultural groups 
and scientific disciplines work together.
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Policy implications, institutional and management issues 
Trials in various countries have produced various recommendations for in-
tegrating behavioural insights into public institutions as well as policy and 
regulatory processes:
• The experience gained by the UK Behavioural Unit Team (BIT) and the US 
Office of Science & Technology Policy (OSTP) Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Team (SBST) in the White House indicate that these government-integrated 
units need first to obtain political buy-in and then create the demand from 
others in government. They have to trigger curiosity and interest, for example 
by getting some of the results in quickly, to gain credibility and overcome 
institutional inertia before undertaking long-term tasks.
• It is recommended that Behavioural Units are located within central govern-
ment. The UK BIT was set up in 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office. It 
is now partially outsourced with a 4-year contract binding it to Government 
while also allowing it to provide consultancy services to other bodies. 
• Other initiatives can be organised as part of a network. Some of these 
are internal to government such as in the Netherlands and Singapore. In 
Denmark the networks are more holistic and are organised externally to 
government with a wide range of stakeholders e.g. industry, not-for-profit 
organisations, academia, etc.
• These initiatives need to recruit the right people, with the relevant expertise. It 
is unusual to find experts in behavioural sciences working in traditional public 
administrations and so external recruiting is very often necessary. As part 
of a secondary stage, training can be set up for others to increase capacity.
• Building up connections with academia is useful, and in particular within 
the business sector, communications and marketing schools, even if the 
latter are not familiar with the specificities of the public sector.
• Maintaining connections with industry is also useful, in particular to counter 
opposition from industry, as discussed in section 3.
• Interventions inspired by behavioural initiatives will require (as well as most 
probably contribute to) a change of culture in public administration, for 
example by forming a network of change agents. To generate the necessary 
conditions for success, governments are advised to give change agents 
space for manoeuvre and shelter. In this manner they are able to learn from 
experience and even from failure.
BI-based interventions will only succeed if there is a feeling of confidence be-
tween the regulators who design them and those to whom they are targeted. 
At the same time, well-designed interventions that meet people’s objectives 
and their needs can contribute to restoring trust in regulatory authorities. 
Overall, they reduce the cost of regulatory compliance and improve the 
general efficiency of risk management.
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Glossary 
EFPIA European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries  
and Associations
ENCePP European Network of Centres  
for Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance
EMA European Medicines Agency
EU European Union
FDA Food and Drug Administration
HTA Health technology assessment
MAPP Medicines Adaptive Pathways for Patients
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation  
and Development
PCORnet National Patient-Centered Clinical Research Network
PML Progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy 
RCTs Randomised controlled trial
R&D Research And Development
REMS/RMS Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
US United States of America
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The pharmaceuticals sector provides an archetypical example of proactive 
public sector risk governance. Unlike ordinary consumer products, drugs may 
not be marketed without advance regulatory approval. Licensing is based 
on projections of safety, efficacy, and acceptable manufacturing quality, with 
revisions to the conditions of licenses as safety, efficacy or quality issues 
arise in use. On 10 October 2014, the OECD and IRGC sponsored a panel on 
risk governance in pharmaceuticals, with a mandate to describe sources of 
innovation in pharmaceuticals development and use, to present regulatory, 
patient and industry perspectives on managing benefits and risks, and dis-
cussing current European Medicines Agency (EMA) and US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approaches to the management of risks and uncertainty 
over the full life cycle of drugs. The panelists jointly produced this distillation 
of presentations and summary of discussion themes.
1. Defining the context for pharmaceuticals risk 
governance: Crises and evolutionary pressures 
Kenneth Oye of the MIT Center for Biomedical Innovation and Mark Pearson 
of the OECD defined the context within which current benefit and risk man-
agement reforms are taking place. They described a series of crises that have 
prompted reforms in drug licensing within the OECD nations. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, birth defects produced by Thalidomide prompted adoption of 
more stringent standards for demonstration of efficacy and safety in advance 
of approval and to strengthening of adverse effects reporting systems. In the 
1970s and 1980s, the demands of HIV and cancer patients for earlier access 
to live saving medicines prompted development of accelerated approval and 
conditional marketing authorization pathways, with deferred validation of bio-
markers. In the 2000s, adverse effects caused by Vioxx, Accutane and other 
drugs prompted improvements in aftermarket surveillance programs and to 
by Kenneth A. Oye 1, Mark Pearson 2, Hans- Georg Eichler 3,  
Theresa Mullin 4 and Anton Hoos 5
MANAGING UNCERTAINTY  
IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND USE 
INFORMED REGULATION   
ENHANCING ADAPTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY 
IN PHARMACEUTICALS REGULATION
1 MIT; 2 OECD; 3 European Medicines Agency; 4 US Food and Drug Administration; 5 Amgen.
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requirements for programs to manage known risks (REMS/RMS). Finally, 
backlogs in licensing developed, produced by the regulatory challenge of 
simultaneously improving standards for demonstration of safety and efficacy, 
providing early access to drugs, managing known risks and strengthening 
registries and aftermarket surveillance. In the US, the backlog was cleared 
as pharmaceutical firms covered the 
costs of licensing through payment 
of prescription drug user fees. These 
crisis-driven reforms have improved 
detection of severe adverse effects, 
improved management of identified 
risks and accelerated patient access 
to drugs for unmet life threatening 
medical needs. 
Current calls for reform follow less 
from crises than from sustained evo-
lutionary pressures on regulators, 
drug developers, patients, providers 
and payers, see Figure 1. 
First, within both the United States and Europe, increasing late stage failures 
during clinical trials have contributed to rising costs of drug development. In 
addition, drug companies in the US have added pharmacoeconomic studies 
to traditional safety and efficacy studies. Marketing requirements, specifically 
the need to support the addition of new drugs to managed care drug formu-
laries, have contributed to a rise in drug development costs. Globalization 
of markets has also led to multi-regional clinical trials and additional data 
collection needs. As Figure 2 suggests, in the United States, R&D efficiency 
has been declining steadily, with the 2010 cost of bringing a drug to market 
running at about $US 1.5 billion. Within Europe, the cost of bringing a complex 
new drug to market now approaches € 1.7 billion, heavily loaded toward the 
cost of trials conducted at the back end of the process. 
Second, as the scientific revolution 
in genetics reshapes medicine, an 
increasing number of treatments 
in development now target smaller 
genetically defined sub-populations 
instead of larger heterogeneous 
populations. This splintering of dis-
ease populations and narrowing of 
labelled indications is improving the 
effectiveness of medicine. It is also 
increasing the difficulty of recruiting 
adequate numbers of confounder 
cleansed subjects for the clinical tri-
als that provide an evidentiary basis 
for projecting the safety and efficacy 
of drugs. As Figure 3 suggests, drugs 
serving small numbers of patients 
are priced high. The splintering of 
Figure 1: Evolutionary Pressures  
for Reform
Figure 2: Trends in US R&D Efficiency in Drug Development
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indications has also created small-
er market niches that are often filled 
by only one drug rather than two or 
more competing drugs, weakening 
or eliminating market pressures to 
ease pricing. Smaller market niches 
affect the size of the base from which 
sponsors may recover costs, as de-
velopment and testing expenses are 
spread across fewer patients. Taken 
together, these evolutionary changes 
have simultaneously increased drug 
development costs and raised drug 
prices. 
Third, subjects with comorbidities and subjects taking other drugs are ex-
cluded from clinical trials to optimize for detection of treatment effects. But 
because patients often suffer from more than one ailment, take other drugs, 
and fail to adhere to labels, confounder cleansed subjects taking drugs in 
trials are imperfect surrogates for patients taking drugs in the real world. 
Confounder cleansing of populations of subjects taking drugs in trials 
increases the ability to detect a drug effect if it is there, but decreases 
external validity. Progressive reduction of resulting uncertainties will need 
to be achieved by way of subsequent studies that could range from clinical 
trials to the use of data from observational studies. Observational studies 
should complement, not replace, RCTs. Capabilities within three key domains 
are important to make observational studies a valuable source of information: 
data and infrastructure, methodology to address the inherent limitations of 
non-randomised information, and, lastly, operational enablers including, for 
example, organisational processes, mind-sets and legal frameworks. 
These developments define a complex setting for benefit-risk management 
in pharmaceuticals. Risk management in medicine now entails engaging 
with risks associated with medical and other health products, risks to public 
budgets from the adoption and coverage of new therapeutics, and risks to 
patient privacy from novel uses of medical data. The European Union and the 
United States have been converging in their approaches to drug licensing, 
with substantial areas of commonality and some differences remaining. With 
reference to speed, the US FDA approves cancer drugs more quickly than 
the EU EMA. With reference to process, the US FDA is more demanding than 
the EMA for biosimilars. The EU offers generalized handling of PROMS while 
the US retains a symptom specific approach. With reference to outcomes 
in licensing of oncology drugs, 50 percent of drugs are treated identically, 
30 percent of drugs have some differences in labelling and in 20 percent 
of cases a drug is accepted by one and rejected by the other. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, there do not appear to be differences in attitude to risk 
on population level, with some differences in regulation on a case by case 
basis. Future trends suggest continuing convergence, with greater patient 
involvement in defining willingness to accept risks, with life cycle approaches 
to the management of risks of product and with integrated assessments of 
benefits as well as risks. 
Figure 3: Drug Costs for Selected 
Rare Disorders
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As will be discussed by Hans-Georg Eichler, Theresa Mullin, and Anton Hoos, 
OECD nations face four challenges. 
First, market entry regulation will be under sustained pressure for reform. 
New therapeutic technologies will continue to focus on smaller populations, 
uncertainty over the efficacy, safety and effectiveness of these emerging 
technologies will continue to rise, and novel products will strain market entry 
regulations. For example, therapeutics that are half medicine and half medical 
devices, regenerative medicines and other living therapeutics simply do not 
fit easily within existing licensing frames.
Second, clinical trials need to be harmonized and streamlined. In 2013, the 
OECD issued recommendations on the governance of clinical trials. These 
recommendations aimed at improving consistency in the interpretation of 
national regulations, introduced a proportionate regulatory approach, and 
enhanced protection of trial participants. Both the US and European Union 
have launched initiatives to simplify and improve regulation of clinical trials. 
Third, regulatory science needs to be modernized. This will entail encour-
aging dialog between innovators and regulators, to improve understandings 
of scientific developments while maintaining sensitivity to risks of regulatory 
capture. This also entails increasing transparency in decision-making pro-
cesses with open acknowledgement of ethical concerns, open recognition 
of local values and open engagement with patients and providers as well as 
payers and sponsors. 
Finally, the traditional focus on benefit-risk in the context of evidence gener-
ation on safety and efficacy for licensing must now be broadened to include 
a second focus on benefit in the context of evidence generation on the 
effectiveness for treatment and reimbursement. Faced with rising costs for 
pharmaceuticals and increasing political pressure to contain costs, patients, 
physicians and payers are demanding better information on the effective-
ness of drugs. Although beyond the purview of traditional pharmaceuticals 
regulatory agencies such as the EMA and FDA, the acquisition, analysis 
and interpretation of evidence on effectiveness of drugs in use will be an 
increasingly significant element of health care policy.
2. Developments in Europe: Managing uncertainty 
over the life-span of drug development and use
Hans-Georg Eichler, Senior Medical Officer of the European Medicines 
Agency, described recent EMA developments including pharmacovigilance 
legislation, greater trials data access, the EMA/EUnetHTA Post Market Data 
Plan, and the EMA adaptive licensing pilots. Regulators have to manage 
competing objectives. Under traditional approaches to drug licensing, drug 
companies rely on models, in vitro studies and animal studies and randomized 
clinical trials using confounder cleansed subjects to demonstrate the safety 
and superior efficacy of a drug. Former FDA Deputy Commissioner Murray 
Lumpkin speaks of the “magic moment” when a drug is either approved or 
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rejected. Carefully monitored subjects become lightly observed patients, ex-
perimental therapeutics become accepted treatments, drugs are transformed 
from unproven to safe and effective. 
This traditional binary model of drug 
approval, described by the upper 
diagram in Figure 4, is now chang-
ing rapidly toward explicitly adaptive 
approaches to licensing with patient 
experience contributing to evidence 
development. The bottom diagram 
describes an adaptive approach to 
licensing. At the front end, approval 
would come earlier, would be limited 
to patients with the most favorable 
priors benefit/risk and would be 
conditional. At the back end, obser-
vations of patient experience would 
be strengthened through greater 
reliance on registry and electron-
ic health records, with systematic 
analysis of that experience to evalu-
ate safety and effectiveness, and with modification of labels and the terms 
and conditions of licensing based on patient experience. Conditions now 
favor implementation of adaptive approaches to risk governance, with both 
demands for more adaptive approaches to licensing and factors enabling 
implementation of adaptive approaches. The arguments below are developed 
more fully in Eichler et al. “From adaptive licensing to adaptive pathways: 
Delivering a flexible life-span approach to bring new drugs to patients”, in 
Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, Volume 97, Issue 3, pages 234–246, 
March 2015. 
2.1 
The demand side: Conditions creating 
support for adaptive licensing
Four environmental changes described below have converged to heighten 
interest in the use of adaptive pathways for the development of new drug 
products.
Demand from patients for timely access to address unmet medical 
needs: A key driver for adaptive pathways is growing pressure for timely 
access by patients and their advocates. In the words of a patient represent-
ative, “I do not benefit from a drug that is approved on the day of my funeral. 
The safest drug that one cannot afford or that arrives too late is of no benefit 
to a patient.” Calls for rapid access to new treatments originally came from 
advocates for patients with HIV, cancer and orphan conditions. Patients with 
chronic, slow irreversibly progressing diseases with unsatisfactory treatment 
options are now making the same plea for urgent access as do those with 
fast progressing conditions. From a patient’s perspective, duration of the 
disease course should not be the key input variable when making the access 
Figure 4: Traditional and Adaptive 
Licensing
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versus evidence trade-off. Adaptive pathways recast this ethical dilemma to 
achieve an appropriate trade-off between ‘unmet need’ and ‘less certainty.’
First, under an adaptive licensing approach, patient-access to treatment 
should be driven by the likelihood that the treatment will succeed in ad-
dressing an unmet need. Decisions on whether to accept a new treatment 
on a smaller evidence base can be guided by response rates on surrogate 
endpoints in small patient cohorts or by considerations laid out in FDA criteria 
for breakthrough therapy designation.
Second, adaptive licensing is not about changing benefit-risk trade-offs. Un-
der any licensing or coverage paradigm, expected benefits should outweigh 
expected risks for a defined patient population. Anything else is unethical. 
The issue is whether uncertainties around benefit and risk estimates must 
be resolved at the time of initial licensing and coverage decisions or whether 
positive decisions may be based on the balance of probabilities with con-
tinuous monitoring. 
Third, any acceptance of ‘less certainty’ about a product can only be tempo-
rary, even in the face of high unmet need. Adaptive licensing is designed to 
foster the progressive reduction of uncertainty by way of pre-agreed evidence 
generation plans and timeframes, with tight utilization management, moni-
toring in the marketplace, and an ability and political willingness to restrict or 
withdraw a product if benefit-risk or value for money is less than expected. 
Together, these precautions should reduce realized risks for patients relative 
to current approaches.
Demand for regulations appropriate to stratified treatment populations: 
Improved understandings of pathologies have led to a growing number of 
defined treatment subpopulations, with disease stratifications based on 
genotypic biomarkers and dedicated companion diagnostics. 
First, screening-out those likely to develop serious toxicity may allow others 
to continue to benefit from a drug. In the past, without the ability to identify 
those patients likely to experience serious adverse events, many patients were 
denied potential benefits of treatments. Over the next decade, increasingly 
sophisticated sub-stratification will pose challenges for decision-making on 
licensing and coverage. Heterogeneity and complexity will result in a large 
number of narrowly defined patient subgroups. For example, some mutations 
are more common than others and conventional RCTs will be feasible for 
some subgroups and not for others. As a consequence, obtainable levels of 
evidence at the time of licensing decisions will vary across mutation groups. 
For less common mutations, benefit-risk information may be based on re-
al-world data accrued late in a product’s lifespan.
Second, the trend is from subgroup specific medicines toward ‘custom-made’ 
medicines. For example, patients receive individualized treatments in gene 
therapies based on modified patient-derived cells, antisense oligonucleo-
tides and other types of advanced therapies. Treatment-eligible populations 
are now approaching an ‘n of 1’. Basket licensing of a family of products 
with individual variations may be the only viable route to market, but even 
minor changes in the molecular structure of a drug could result in significant 
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changes in toxicity profiles. An adaptive development and licensing approach 
with modification of initial basket licensing decisions grounded on rigorous 
observation of patients may be needed. 
Finally, ethical questions on trade-offs between the interests of future versus 
current patients will likely have different answers for each individual sub 
population. Acceptable uncertainty will be dependent on patient subgroup 
disease burdens, potential for benefit, and declared preferences on trade-offs 
across uncertainty and access to new therapies.
Demands from payers for evidence-based reimbursement: Only a small 
and shrinking fraction of expensive new drug treatments are paid out-of-
pocket by patients. Decisions by third party payers on whether and how to 
reimburse are gaining increasing importance to both patients and marketing 
authorization holders. Regulatory approval is a necessary but not sufficient 
pre-condition for effective patient access. There is growing awareness among 
many payers that they, like the regulators, cannot escape the acrimonious 
debate over access versus evidence. Payers recognize that the distinction 
between experimental versus medically necessary is based on a simplified 
view of evidence and uncertainty, with explicit recognition of the evolving 
strength of evidence. Many payers are shifting from seeing decisions on 
reimbursement as a one time binary decision, to seeing reimbursement de-
cisions as on-going processes aiming at providing greater certainty about 
value for money as evidence accumulates. Once a coverage decision has 
been made, payers have an interest in limiting initial use to subpopulations 
with the best benefit-risk ratios, in improving patient adherence, in monitoring 
treatment outcomes and in modifying conditions of reimbursement in light 
of evidence on effectiveness. 
Demand from pharma/investors for sustainable drug development: The 
low productivity of bio-pharmaceutical R&D is the result of factors largely 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, part of the problem rests on factors 
that may be partially addressed through harmonized adoption of adaptive 
approaches to drug development, licensing and reimbursement. Industry is 
moving from blockbuster to niche buster business models, even as payers 
increase evidence requirements for reimbursement and regulators seek to 
revise licensing terms in light of evolving evidence from use. While regula-
tors have achieved some degree of inter-regional harmonization of evidence 
standards, payers are at an earlier point in that dialog. The lack of alignment 
results in differences in standards for drug development. How will adaptive 
pathways help? Because adaptive licensing requires early engagement with 
all stakeholders, an adaptive approach to licensing should catalyze consensus 
building among payers both within and across regions. In fact, the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) is now 
working to create a framework for implementation of ‘Medicines Adaptive 
Pathways for Patients’ (MAPPs). 
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2.2 
The supply side: Conditions enabling adaptive licensing
Even as the factors discussed above have increased demand for adaptive 
licensing, other developments have improved the prospects for implemen-
tation of adaptive pathways. 
Better understanding of disease: The revolution in genetics noted above 
and the use of epidemiological data in reanalysis of past clinical trials may 
improve the efficiency of RCTs and improve validation of surrogate endpoints. 
This may reduce the need for concurrent control groups in rare diseases 
and provide better reference points against which post-licensing evidence 
generation may be assessed. 
Innovative clinical trial designs: Adaptive trial designs offer an opportunity 
to use accumulating results to focus on patient subgroups that respond bet-
ter to a therapy and to evaluate populations of patients similar to targeted 
patient groups. Adaptive trials provide a method for improving operational 
continuity from pre to post-authorization phases. Adaptive trial designs can 
also improve the terms of trade-offs between robust evidence generation 
and patient access to promising therapies in trials by minimizing placebo 
exposure of patients through interim adjustments. 
Rapid learning systems in the healthcare environment: While imperfect, 
electronic data in health records or dedicated registries are increasingly stand-
ardized, reliable and complete. Data on patient reported outcomes, treatment 
adherence data, morbidity, and daily activities are likely to become more 
available as e-health records expand and data compatibility is increased. At 
the same time, methodologies have been developed to address, to the extent 
possible, confounding and selection biases in observational studies. Finally, 
data owners are now developing common data models, protocols to query 
data sets, and governance models. These developments have resulted in 
significant improvements in the detection of safety signals and evaluation of 
effectiveness in the real world, including the US FDA Mini-Sentinel Initiative, 
the European Network of Centres for Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharma-
covigilance (ENCePP) and the US Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Network called ‘PCORnet’. 
Bringing patients to the table: Patients’ views should be paramount when 
judging the acceptability of levels of clinical uncertainty for a given treat-
ment scenario. Obtaining representative views from patients is an on-going 
mutual learning process for both patient representatives and decision-makers. 
Regulators and HTA bodies now invite patients to declare their preferen- 
ces on clinical trial endpoints and benefit-risk-uncertainty trade-offs, with 
promising results to date. Most fundamentally, actively engaging patients in 
decision-making about their own care enhances transparency, earns trust 
and enlists patient support for the secondary use of health data to enable 
evidence generation through the post-licensing phase. 
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From prediction to monitoring: A common adage among regulators used 
to be that once a drug ‘is out the door’ their powers to monitor and steer use 
and to detect or mitigate risks was limited. In recent years, progress has been 
made on two fronts that may enable regulators to move from a prediction to 
a monitoring paradigm.
First, regulators can now impose and enforce on marketing authorisation hold-
ers an array of post-licensing requirements to improve information on benefits 
and risks. Although the imposition of post-licensing information gathering 
requirements is less common in the US than in the EU, the legal authority to 
impose additional post-licensing requirements exists in both jurisdictions. 
Second, post-licensing identification of adverse drug effects has improved 
dramatically, see Figure 5. In the 1950s and 1960s, thalidomide use in 
pregnancy caused phocomelia, a highly visible adverse effect with a low back-
ground incidence. It took around 
10,000 cases before healthcare 
professionals made the connection 
between thalidomide use and phoc-
omelia. Contrast this tragically slow 
learning with recent rapid detection 
of adverse effects. Adverse effects 
of tysabri natalizumab were detected 
after only three cases of PML were 
reported. Adverse effects of H1N1 
pandemic flu vaccine Pandemrix 
were investigated after the Swed-
ish Medicines Agency received only 
six reports of narcolepsy following 
vaccination. Yet our ability to detect 
adverse drug reactions with small 
risk ratios on high-background 
events is limited.
Targeted prescribing: When a drug is initially intended for use by a well 
defined subset of patients, wide-spread use by patients outside of the tar-
get group might open the door to negative patient outcomes. Regulators 
have some limited tools to steer drug utilization by way of controlled access 
programs, prescriber restrictions, educational requirements, and clinical 
reminder systems. In practice, payers, healthcare systems providers and 
professional societies, rather than regulators, are the stewards of appropriate 
prescribing. As new premium priced drugs enter the market, payer interests 
in effectiveness and cost-containment are leading to increasingly regimented 
use through pre-authorization requirements, prescribing audits, prescriber 
restrictions, tiered co-payments and mandatory treatment protocols. Regu-
lator and payer actions in cooperation with the bodies that produce clinical 
practice guidelines are likely to improve prescription controls, particularly for 
diseases that are treated in specialist centers.
Figure 5: From Prediction  
to Observation and Monitoring
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2.3 
Conclusion
This presentation treats environmental changes that have increased demand 
for adaptive approaches to benefit-risk management and that enable the 
transition from traditional to adaptive approaches. However, significant chal-
lenges remain if the potential benefits of adaptive approaches to licensing 
are to be realized. 
Some potential problems are technocratic and legal. Adaptive approaches 
to risk governance require the integration of lessons from post-marketing 
observational data and data from experimental trials in a manner that com-
pensates for the weaknesses of each. Observational data including payer 
records and electronic health records are subject to selection biases, misrep-
resentations of indications, simple errors and noise, presenting problems in 
terms of internal validity of inferences. The development of methods of data 
standardization and curation and methods of causal inference suited to data 
with biases and selection effects present technical challenges. Clinical trials 
of limited duration, with high patient adherence in populations cleansed of 
comorbidities and use of other drugs present problems in terms of external 
validity – generalization from trials to ordinary treatment populations. The 
integration of observational and trial-based information, including working 
back from hypotheses generated from post-market observational data to 
limited trials to confirmatory targeted trials, presents legal as well as technical 
challenges. To make adaptive licensing function effectively will require work 
on terms of access to data, including analysis of intellectual property rights, 
human subjects protocols and privacy rules. 
Some potential problems are political and economic. First, experience has 
shown that it is politically challenging to remove a drug from the market or to 
restrict payment should the initial benefit-risk balance not be confirmed post 
approval. Once patients have access to a drug, resistance to withdrawal can 
be intense. These issues will require substantial discussion before rather than 
after conditional approval of drugs, with inclusion of patient groups as critical 
stakeholders. Second, once early access is obtained, not all developers will 
be interested in making good on controls, observation and potential narrowing 
of terms of access that constitute the ‘back end’ of adaptive licensing. Care 
must be taken to ensure that this post-marketing ‘back end’ of adaptive 
licensing is fully implemented. Controls on initial prescriptions, systematic 
post-marketing observation of safety and effectiveness of drugs-as-used, 
and modification of the terms of licensing and reimbursement based on real 
world experience are critical to effective management of uncertainty over the 
life cycle of drugs. In practice, this will depend on engagement with payers – 
with a clear interest in evaluating effectiveness - as well as sponsors. 
Finally, implementation of adaptive pathways will be more difficult in the US 
than the EU. For example, limiting access to an approved drug to a subset of 
the population will be more difficult in the US, where the practice of medicine 
allows for off-label use, than in the EU. While sponsors, regulators, HTA bodies 
and payers are now collaborating in the EU, other jurisdictions, notably the 
US, do not have national healthcare systems with centralized management 
on access and payment. Conditions within the EU have allowed the EMA 
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to conduct pilot projects to assess the feasibility of adaptive pathways to 
licensing. At the end of the day, the characteristics of adaptive approaches 
to licensing will be shaped by differences in national and regional conditions 
and by observation, analysis and feedback from regulatory experience. 
3. Developments in the United States: Managing 
risk and uncertainty through the drug life cycle
Dr. Theresa Mullin, Director of the Office of Strategic Programs of the US 
Food and Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
described recent US developments, including patient-focused drug develop- 
ment, FDA Breakthrough Product Designation, formalized benefit-risk 
assessment, and use of pharmaceutical quality metrics. A benefit-risk ap-
proach frames all FDA risk management decisions across the life cycle of a 
drug, with emphasis on transparency 
and continuous learning. FDA initia-
tives include Patient Focused Drug 
Development and FDA Breakthrough 
Product Designation early in the drug 
life cycle, the use of pharmaceutical 
quality metrics in manufacturing of 
generics late in the drug life cycle 
to cover off-patent drugs 80 percent 
of which are generic, and the use of 
benefit-risk analysis throughout the 
life cycle. 
The FDA uses a Formalized Benefit-Risk Assessment approach to structure 
and manage the technical complexity of new drug assessment, see Figure 6. 
This assessment is informed by science, medicine, policy, and judgment. The 
law and regulations concerning the drug review process generally provide 
broad principles and are not case-specific, so FDA works to develop consist-
ent policy in taking action within its legal and regulatory authority, to make 
decisions in a way that is fair, not arbitrary or capricious. FDA communicates 
this policy through guidance. However, in a given case it may determine that a 
generally applicable guidance is inappropriate, and in such cases retains the 
flexibility to take a different approach. Since each decision either is made in 
the context of established policy or establishes new policy, this serves FDA as 
a sort of ‘case law’. Although the quantity of information to be evaluated and 
considered by FDA is substantial, there are residual uncertainties resulting, 
for example, from the gaps in the data or current scientific understanding, 
and human judgment and values must come into play. The framework for 
benefit-risk decision-making summarizes the relevant facts, uncertainties, 
and key areas of judgment, and clearly explains how these factors influence 
a regulatory decision. This helps inform and clarify the regulatory discussion. 
It also serves to communicate the basis for FDA’s regulatory decision to the 
public, while documenting the decision for reference as FDA considers similar 
benefit-risk assessments in the future.
Figure 6: Initiatives in Context  
of Drug Life Cycle. Source: US Food 
and Drug Administration, www.fda.gov
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As shown in Figures 7 and 8, the FDA framework for benefit-risk assessment 
is structured in terms of the following five major considerations (corresponding 
to the rows): the analysis of severity of the disease condition being targeted 
by the drug; a review of current treatment options to determine the degree of 
unmet medical need; benefits observed in clinical trials; risks reflected by the 
safety findings from clinical trials; and consideration of whether the identified 
risks can be managed to ensure benefits would exceed risks. Each of these 
five considerations is further structured into two areas to identify (a) the facts 
that are known versus residual uncertainties for each consideration, and (b) 
the conclusions and reasons of the reviewers’ assessment of the evidence 
and uncertainties.
The FDA uses a qualitative approach that is 
grounded in quantification of data elements at 
the time of marketing approval. Benefits are 
grounded in data on efficacy endpoints from 
controlled clinical trials. Risks are grounded 
in data on harms reported in clinical trials and 
from spontaneous adverse effect reports. The 
evaluation of benefits and risks is dynamic, 
with understandings of both benefits and risks 
evolving over the product life cycle. This is not 
a mechanistic process. 
FDA developed the Patient Focused Drug Development program (PFDD) 
in recognition that patients are uniquely qualified to inform clinical context 
for FDA’s benefit-risk assessment: in particular the impact of disease on 
patients, i.e., the analysis of condition, and the 
effectiveness of currently available therapies in 
treating the disease impacts that matter most 
to patients. The traditional patient represent-
ative program only enabled participation of 
individual patients who received conflict of in-
terest screening and some regulatory process 
training, and those patient representatives 
have had burden of speaking for all those 
with a disease. Yet one size does not fit all 
who are afflicted with a given disease. The 
FDA needed more diversity. In a pilot exercise, 
FDA is setting up 20 different public webcast 
meetings in 20 different disease areas. Only patients are allowed to speak. 
The patient input in the meetings held since the start of this initiative in 2013 
have been well-attended by patients and have provided powerful insights 
for FDA reviewers and also for industry sponsors who have attended the 
meetings. Public stakeholders and industry have identified this initiative as 
a priority for further expansion in the coming years, see Figures 9 and 10. 
The FDA established Breakthrough Therapy Designation to foster more 
rapid development of drugs that offer the potential of substantial improve-
ment in patient outcome. The FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) of 
2012 Section 902 provided for a new Breakthrough Therapy Designation. A 
breakthrough therapy is a drug which: (a) is intended alone or in combina-
Figure 7: FDA Benefit-Risk Framework 
(Columns). Source: US Food and Drug 
Administration, www.fda.gov
Figure 8: FDA Benefit-Risk 
Framework (Rows). Source: US Food 
and Drug Administration, www.fda.gov
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tion with one or more other drugs to treat a 
serious or life threatening disease or condition 
and; (b) preliminary clinical evidence indicates 
that the drug may demonstrate substantial 
improvement over existing therapies on one or 
more clinically significant endpoints, such as 
substantial treatment effects observed early in 
clinical development. Breakthrough designa-
tion is based on preliminary clinical evidence 
of potential improvement on a clinically signif-
icant endpoint relative to available therapies. 
By contrast, Fast Track designation is based 
on nonclinical or clinical evidence of the potential to address unmet medical 
needs. Both Breakthrough and Fast Track programs are intended to expedite 
the development and review of drugs for serious or life threatening conditions. 
If a drug is designated as a Breakthrough 
Therapy, FDA will expedite development and 
review of the drug. The program is establishing 
a rolling review process with additional en-
gagement between FDA staff and applicants. 
Prequalification based on the criteria outlined 
in Section 902 is required. Requests for break-
through designation may be submitted with 
the Investigation of New Drug (IND) application 
with at least one phase I trial complete. Break-
through designation has substantial benefits 
to the sponsor, with almost unlimited meetings 
to discuss study designs and development 
processes to avoid delays and mistakes. These measures have reduced 
clinical development time by half, down from an average of 7 to 10 years, 
with clear benefits for sponsors seeking to reduce development costs and 
patients seeking earlier access. As of October 2014, 190 applications for 
breakthrough designation had been submitted and 57 applications had been 
accepted, see Figure 11. 
The FDA Pharmaceutical Quality Metrics 
Program addresses risk management chal-
lenges in global regulatory oversight of drug 
manufacturing, which is relevant to both pre-
market evaluation of facilities and subsequent 
monitoring of the state of manufacturing qual-
ity control for marketed drugs later in their life 
cycle. With increasingly global supply chains, 
active ingredients, excipients, and finished 
dosage forms are typically produced overseas 
in different facilities in different countries some 
of which have limited regulatory capacity and less developed infrastructure. 
Because consumers and health care payers (i.e., the market) often cannot 
discern differences in quality there has been less of a market incentive for 
manufacturers to invest in quality. As shown in Figure 12, failures to invest in 
manufacturing quality, presumably in order to remain cost competitive, have 
Figure 9: Patient-Focused Drug 
Development. Source: US Food and 
Drug Administration, www.fda.gov
Figure 10: PFDD Meetings FY 
13-15. Source: US Food and Drug 
Administration, www.fda.gov
Figure 11: Breakthrough Therapy 
Designations. Source: US Food and 
Drug Administration, www.fda.gov
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been identified as a leading factor in recent 
and widely publicized drug shortages. FDA’s 
new program to explore the use of manufac-
turing quality data that is already required by 
statute to be provided to FDA investigators 
upon inspection of a facility, could help inform 
this important dimension of value. 
The intention of the program is to induce 
industry to improve manufacturing and over-
sight of manufacturing and to facilitate a more 
risk-based inspection schedule, via improving 
FDA surveillance of the state of the firms’ quality systems and product and 
process capability, with less frequent inspections for better performing sites. 
The program should also support the aim of achieving enhanced product 
quality without the need for extensive regulatory oversight and ultimately may 
help to drive a reduction in quality-related shortages and recalls. 
4. A call for adaptability and flexibility 
from a patient and industry view
Anton Hoos, Principal of M4P (Medicines4Patients) Consulting at the time of 
the conference and currently Vice President of Amgen, examined EMA and 
US initiatives from the perspectives of industry and patients. He examined 
sponsor interests in how regulatory reforms mesh with product development 
realities and patient interests in access to safe and efficacious medicines. All 
stakeholders in the health area must serve the needs of patients and society, 
but the collective and individual needs of patients vary widely. The range of 
expectations of the benefit associated with a particular medication and the 
potential risk a patient / caregiver is willing to accept depends on the condition 
to treat or to prevent. For vaccination of healthy individuals, acceptance of 
potential adverse effects is typically low. For life threatening conditions that 
may lead to death within a very short period of time, acceptance of potential 
adverse effects is typically substantial, see Figure 13. 
In this context it is important to reach an un-
derstanding across all stakeholders about the 
benefit and risk of a therapeutic or prophylac-
tic intervention and the degree of uncertainty 
associated with the available data at any 
point in time. The more data that is request-
ed for a particular therapy or intervention the 
more time or cost will be required to make a 
therapy available. Historically all gatekeepers 
involved in the health system have requested more data to optimize their 
individual data set without coordination with other parties. This is true of 
regulators, HTA agencies and payers, both within and across each of these 
silos. This has led to an enormous increase of cost for the pharmaceutical 
sector and it may lead to a net disadvantage in terms of public health benefit.
Figure 12: Drug Shortages and 
Quality Problems. Source: US Food 
and Drug Administration, www.fda.gov
Figure 13: Risk/Uncertainty Reduction 
vs. Public Health Benefit
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Compared to any other sector, R&D expenditure in pharmaceutical industry 
are enormous:
While all stakeholders are making an effort to work with patients, their voice 
has not been heard sufficiently. A recent study by the UK Genetic Alliance 
reported that patients find the current regulatory process slow, bureaucratic, 
paternalistic and opaque. A European insight derived from the UK Genetic 
Alliance study reveals that some 50 percent of patients would like to see joint 
decision-making from setting the research agenda via designing clinical trials 
to regulatory decisions:
Interestingly many patients would be open to accept higher risk and uncer-
tainty when offered access to new medicines. As Figure 16 suggests, patients 
believe that regulators should allow patients to secure access to medicines 
even if earlier access means that tests would rely on smaller numbers of 
subjects in trials and that approvals would be granted with more uncertainty 
over efficacy and safety. However, patients expressed reluctance to accept 
serious side effects and significant risk of death as the price of early access. 
Figure 14: R&D Expenditure per 
Employee 2000 – 2007
Figure 15: Patients’ View on Decision-
making
Figure 16: Patients’ View on Access 
to Medicines
78 //  Improving Risk Regulation
Patients are increasingly engaging in the drug development, approval and 
reimbursement process with the goal to secure timely access to medicines 
that they need. The US National Health Council published their view about 
patient involvement in the regulatory process as follows:
The mandate of all regulators is to license safe and efficacious medicines. 
Given that all stakeholders, first and foremost patients, seem to be willing 
to accept a higher degree of uncertainty in return for earlier access to much 
needed medicines, adaptive approaches to drug licensing and reimbursement 
are needed. Key aspects will include joint prospective planning, agreement 
on the acceptable degree of uncertainty and risk as well as continuous eval-
uation of benefit and risk during a gradual broadening of access to patients. 
In March 2014 the EMA started its pilot program for adaptive licensing to 
determine whether and how these principles might be translated into practice. 
5. Discussion
Theresa Mullin and Hans-Georg Eichler emphasized similarities in the US 
and European approaches to risk management. Mullin spoke of flexibility and 
discrimination within the US process, with degrees of acceleration, strength 
of controls on initial use, and reliance on adaptive elements tuned to patient 
interests in safety, efficacy and early access to address unmet needs. Eichler 
spoke of how the US and EU share common goals, with similar upstream 
pre-licensing processes, similar policies addressing quality problems in licit, 
counterfeit and illegal drugs, and emerging differences in post-licensing 
downstream risk management. 
Those downstream differences are a product, not of philosophical differenc-
es, but of sharp differences in the structure of reimbursement. The EU has 
public payers while the US has a plethora of public and private payers. Within 
Europe, payer policies on reimbursement may control off-label use and limit 
inappropriate utilization and prescription. Within the US, the FDA may indirectly 
affect utilization and prescription by altering labels and issuing warnings, 
thereby reshaping liability exposure and altering payer and provider behavior. 
Mark Pearson noted that European public payers had a theoretical option to 
“dereimburse” drugs if warranted by emerging evidence on safety or effective-
ness. Although not widely used, a payer-based approach to adherence could 
be used to encourage physicians and patients to practice evidence-based 
medicine, with practices updated on the basis of emerging information. An-
ton Hoos reinforced Pearson’s observation on controls of inappropriate drug 
Figure 17: Patients’ View on 
Engagement
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use, noting that industry as well as payers could exercise some controls on 
distribution and use by physicians. Theresa Mullin picked up on the theme 
of improving physician risk-benefit governance, stressing the need to set up 
accessible information systems and risk management protocols. 
Hans-Georg Eichler offered some cautionary words, noting that many of the 
proposed remedies are self-limiting. Risk management by limiting the right to 
prescribe to trained physicians can work well, as it has done with the re-intro-
duction of thalidomide. But this approach can only work for a small number 
of therapeutics and physicians. Similarly, relying on physicians and payers to 
analyze dossiers to establish patient eligibility with complex screening criteria 
can work well, but is personnel intensive. Decision support tools will be needed 
if that strategy is to be used more broadly. Finally, drug prices will affect the 
viability of complex benefit-risk management strategies. As a drug becomes 
cheaper, industry interest in addressing risks to market the drug will decline. 
6. Questions from the floor
Question: Double blind randomized placebo controlled clinical trials are com-
monly viewed as the gold standard. How prepared are regulators to deal with 
non-randomized data? For basing decisions on information other than RCTs?
Response: Hans-Georg Eichler noted that RCTs are the best tool that we 
have to avoid bias and selection effects. But regulators commonly authorize 
drugs on the basis of information from sources other than large RCTs. Many 
drugs today never see this randomization. Regulators expect to see smaller 
targeted RCTs, more case studies, and observational studies with real life 
data. Regulators will need to learn to use all of these data sources and are 
moving on this trajectory. Theresa Mullin agreed. She noted that Bayesian 
methods needed to be used in analysis of evidence from RCTs and in extrap-
olating from that evidence base to post-licensing observation of drug benefits 
and risks. She added that the expanded use of clinical trial data from multiple 
regions with heterogeneous patient populations could improve the quality of 
those inferences by increasing variation within study populations, but that 
international variations in standards governing the conduct of trials posed 
challenges. Agencies from the US, EU, Japan and others are now actively 
conferring on harmonization of regulatory standards for multi-regional clinical 
trials data. Finally, Kenneth Oye noted that the traditional sequence of RCTs 
first and observational data second might have to be altered. As hypotheses 
on safety, efficacy and effectiveness emerged from studies based on obser-
vational data, targeted RCTs to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses emerging 
from observational studies and to probe causal inferences will come to be 
used more frequently.
Question: How will these developments affect developing countries? 
Response: Theresa Mullin suggested that generalizations across the ex-
tremely diverse set of non-OECD countries may be ill advised. RCTs are now 
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conducted on a global basis. For example, most US companies have sites 
for conducting trials in other continents and secure marketing authorization in 
many countries. While differences in the terms of licensing are common, there 
is significant work sharing. Developing countries typically look at licensing 
decisions by advanced industrial countries and may reference approval else-
where. The New Pharmaceutical Regulators Forum came together to discuss 
operational issues and to leverage the experience and knowledge of others.
Question: Will adaptive licensing be useful for approval of biosimilars? What 
are the potential challenges for international harmonization on biosimilars?
Response: Hans Georg Eichler suggested that regulators seek to make 
new technologies available as soon as is justified by need and risk profile. 
By that definition, a biosimilar is not an innovation. Biosimilars have a place 
at the table because they break monopolies, not to provide access to a new 
therapy. It is not clear why levels of certainty should be reduced if patients 
already have an option. Kenneth Oye noted that as indications splintered and 
target treatment populations grew smaller, more and more monopolies could 
be expected. He suggested that breaking monopolies should be viewed as 
a legitimate factor in drug licensing. Mark Pearson noted that the ultimate 
objective of regulatory policy is not just to license drugs, but rather to deliv-
er better health care to populations. Pearson urged regulators to consider 
licensing drugs to break monopolies and increase access, but also noted 
that such decisions had to be mindful of preserving incentives to innovate. 
Question: What are the prospects for drawing on innovations in information 
technology to improving monitoring for efficacy and adverse effects? These 
innovations include digital prescribing with better records, individual bracelets 
that track exercise, sleep, and vital signs, and drug delivery systems that 
report on use to central locations. 
Response: Anton Hoos described an extensive set of initiatives that make 
good use of new technologies for monitoring use with apothecaries, hospitals, 
and doctors. The FDA Sentinel project, Optum Laboratories data analysis 
systems, and Myownmed.com are among many initiatives that capture data 
and make data bases talk. Industry is definitely coming to this big time. 
Hans-Georg Eichler and Theresa Mullin agreed. Without improvements in 
technologies for monitoring, we would be back in the Thalidomide age. 
The technologies are developing and it would be foolish not to use them. 
Risk Evaluation and mitigation strategies can work better with these new 
tools. Mark Pearson, Theresa Mullin and Kenneth Oye offered some notes 
of caution. New online data sources are useful only if they are used. Only 
four OECD countries are linking primary care data to hospitals in a manner 
that allows evaluation of the effects of care. Finally, technical issues matter. 
Data standards, fundamental infrastructure, linkages across data bases and 
tools to extract information from unstructured data are needed. To whom 
is data provided, at each phase in the life cycle of drug development and 
use? How could utilization of data affect the size of markets and rates of 
reimbursement? Private owners of data often lack incentives to place that 
information into the public domain.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS   
FROM RISK REGULATION  
TO AN INNOVATIVE RISK GOVERNANCE
Over the past two centuries, societal problems and citizens’ concerns for 
safety and security have mainly been addressed through public forms of risk 
management. Today, government action mainly seeks to manage risks posed 
by technologies, products, economic and financial activity, and lifestyle choic-
es. To be effective, public risk managers must strike a balance between 
fostering innovation and prosperity on the one hand and maximising 
security and equity on the other – a balance that changes over time. 
Like any other actor facing globalisation, regulators are called upon to 
grasp and react to increasingly inter-connected and intricate problems 
whose emergence, type, scale and evolution are difficult to anticipate and 
control. What more, they have to do so in a context of higher demands from 
stakeholders and the public with regards to transparency, accountability and 
participation in all stages of the risk management cycle – from the identifica-
tion of the mischief to formulating options and assessing impacts, to sharing 
implementation and enforcement tasks and review.
Traditionally, governments have so far responded to the growing sophistica-
tion of the societal challenges by engineering increasingly refined technical 
solutions without denaturing the intrinsic organisational and cultural rationale 
of the public sector. The model based on ever more specific and numerous 
silos of deep expertise and on typically command-and-control regulation is no 
longer the only model fit for purpose – it needs to be refined and complement-
ed, and governments now work at the intersection of multi-disciplinary 
and multi-actor knowledge, to integrate various perspectives.
by Lorenzo Allio 1
1 European Risk Forum and allio|rodrigoconsulting.
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1. Grasping approaches to improving risk regulation
This publication looks at different approaches that have emerged across 
various policy areas and on the initiative of various actors over time, which 
may set the basis for designing innovative risk governance. On the basis of 
the collected papers, these concluding remarks try to shed a light on how 
to ‘read’ them and how to internalise key lessons from those experiences. 
They result in an embryonic roadmap to renovate risk management by public 
authorities – a stimulating agenda ahead. The ambition is to contribute to 
improving the exercise of the regulatory power (through co-decision, 
shared responsibility and transformation) and, by so doing, restoring 
trust and confidence between regulatory authorities and the regulated.
The rationale for public risk management  
is expanding both in nature and scope – from economic 
and discrete to also social and systemic. 
Regulatory interventions are no longer exclusively dictated by the willing-
ness and necessity to curb economic inefficiencies and market failures, 
as modelled by neo-classical economic theories. Regulators still seek to 
intervene when in presence of non-competitive markets, externalities and 
sub-optimal supply of public goods. Yet, social regulation is increasingly 
adopted. It strives to achieve societal objectives, shifting for instance from 
guaranteeing minimum standards for public safety to achieving ‘well-being’ 
in a more normative way. This is not at all wrong per se, but it clearly raises 
the stakes of what regulators ought to do and can do (well).
The desirability and indeed necessity to widen the remit of risk manage-
ment to embrace more comprehensive approaches is a recurring theme 
of the publication. Indeed, various perspectives of such an ‘expanded risk 
management’ are presented across the papers.
 Colin Scott’s analysis of transnational private regulation regimes stresses 
the intrinsic potential of private arrangements, either in terms of direct effi-
ciency gains compared to traditional risk management solutions by public 
authorities, or because of socially-driven incentives to enhance risk manage-
ment options – what he labels ‘community solidarity’. Societal added values 
may be swifter and smoother coordination and functioning of markets and 
more generalised and effective implementation of risk management solutions. 
In addition to the stakeholder collaboration highlighted by Yosie, Scott’s 
paper draws the attention also to the competitive nature implicit in much 
of the transnational private regulatory regimes – and how this needs to be 
managed to avoid distortions or detrimental re-allocation solutions. In any 
event, the examples brought forward show the leadership of private actors 
in topping government action across national boundaries.
 Terry Yosie reviews private sector initiatives for the management of systemic 
risks, presenting approaches to private public partnerships based on well-de-
fined goals, flexibility to reach these goals and an effective checks and balances 
control system. He highlights how piece-meal or discrete approaches might 
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no longer suffice and that systemic risk management is an attempt at cluster-
ing various (types of) risks so as to better manage a system. It is simplistic to 
imagine effective management through individual and disconnected actions, if 
we acknowledge that economic, social, geo-political and environmental risks 
co-exists and affect simultaneously both the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’. 
There are then risks that individually have the potential of disrupting entire 
systems through cascading or ramification effects. Energy black-outs and 
natural disasters are points in case. They can interrupt production or distri-
bution chains that paralyse whole organisational systems. Public managers 
face moreover the challenge of the unpredictability of the occurrence of such 
risks and subsequently the urgency to deploy contingency plans. Stress tests 
are therefore applied periodically to ensure the readiness and effectiveness of 
the planned management options and anticipate bottlenecks. Diversification 
by using right asset allocation mix strategies or insurance helps mitigate such 
systemic risks but it is usually almost impossible to completely avoid them.
Like in Yosie’s line of argument, the trans-boundary nature of systemic 
risks (and the related risk management schemes) testifies here of the 
virtual impossibility to confine interventions within discrete jurisdictions 
and limit them to public actors. We face by definition multi-actor, multi-dis-
ciplinary networked governance. The next step will be to design schemes to 
measure success of private and public-private initiatives to deal with systemic 
risks, including through benchmarking, and to monitor progress of coordi-
nated action. There is a variety of evaluation or monitoring schemes, such 
as those of the Global Reporting Initiative 2, but robust standard approaches 
to measure progress in systemic risk management and sustainability is yet 
to emerge. The relatively recent origin of system-level risk assessments that 
incorporate sustainability account for the high interconnectivity of the tech-
nological, organisational, social and political dimensions offers the private 
sector great opportunities to develop more effective and efficient management 
solutions than in the past.
A further expansion of the traditional risk management concept draws from 
the imperative acknowledgment that any risk management intervention is, 
by its nature, designed to trigger behavioural changes in citizens or com-
panies, or both.
 As Ortwin Renn and Marie-Valentine Florin report, regulators are in-
creasingly considering insights from behavioural sciences to best exploit 
the marginal potential for change in behaviour. The authors underscore the 
importance of making risk management interventions align well with how 
people behave spontaneously, hence leveraging on existing (revealed or la-
tent) preferences and incentives. This not only helps overcome inefficiencies 
linked to command-and-control regulation but it also shifts the emphasis on 
incentive-based, performance-based and outcome-driven solutions. Under-
standing the root causes of individual behaviour and preferences becomes 
increasingly important to achieve effective risk management and to address 
management trade-offs. The challenge is for risk managers to then be able 
and capable to exploit the acquired knowledge and leverage on our heuristic 
and cognitive biases and shortcuts.
2 See www.globalreporting.org.
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Public regulators need to enrich their risk management 
portfolios – from being direct managers to serving  
as catalyst platforms – but they must assert 
themselves as the guardians of transparent and 
rigorous evidence-based decision-making
Systemic, private-driven (multi-stakeholder) risk regulation presents many 
challenges and it might be utopic to foresee its implementation at a global 
level. It has in particular to pass two arduous tests.
• The first test is about trade-off choices: what needs to be given up for 
what? Who should be affected and how? Solutions to these questions 
may well vary from region to region, from issue to issue, but in a systemic 
perspective the calibration of the management solutions might be limited 
and certainly is controversial.
• The second test is about the wide-spread lack of trust between the private 
sector (and multinational corporations in particular) and NGOs and the 
citizens, and the often difficult communication between these actors 
and public authorities. On individual technologies, products or ‘issues’, 
barriers can be (and indeed have been) levelled down. However, many 
systemic policy issues are admittedly still majorly controversial – such as 
authorisation of GMOs, biocides, antibiotics and endocrine disruptors or 
exploitation of non-conventional fossil resources (e.g. shale gas). 
Contemporary risk management needs therefore to rely on ever more porous 
interfaces and thicker dialogue among all involved actors.
 This is clearly an issue that emerges from the insights offered by the dis-
cussion on adaptive licensing in pharmaceutical regulation and the search 
for ever better performing risk management systems, which Ken Oye and 
colleagues highlight in their conference report. The innovative licensing 
approaches developed by EU and US drug regulators take great account of 
the rationales, constraints and motivations of the affected actors, while risk 
assessment practices remain grounded in high quality scientific evidence, 
and cost-benefit appraisals inform risk management decisions. The authors 
stress how greater adaptability of management solutions can address risk ac-
ceptance of specific (individual) patients that await new but not yet accessible 
treatment. This results from the integration of feedback from patients groups 
and the deployment of mechanisms for policy learning from past experience 
along the entire life-cycle of research, product development and licensing.
The new forms of risk management presented in the papers stretch the lim-
its of conventional wisdom when it comes to defining the legitimacy of the 
solutions deployed. So dwell Renn and Florin on the very legality of nudging, 
coming to the conclusion that behaviourally-informed risk regulation to pre-
vent or restrict risky behaviour in fields where freedom is protected by the law 
may be legitimate, as long as it is rooted on democratically (socially) agreed 
societal goals. In turn, the adaptive licensing case study illustrates how such 
an approach is an attempt to walk the thin line trading off uncertainty about 
cost effectiveness and safety on the one hand, and access to new therapies 
and investment cost recovery on the other. While stemming from different 
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rationales, both approaches allow for a conceptual shift from the traditional 
risk management towards more or less controlled forms of what might be 
labelled ‘enlightened experimentalism’. Both behaviourally-informed and 
adaptive regulatory designs are applied to increasingly refined target groups, 
thereby fragmenting solutions that traditional risk regulation has by contrast 
tended to apply erga omnes.
Flexible, adaptive and responsive forms of risk regulation bear great 
potential for effectively meeting societal demands and stimulating in-
novative and efficient solutions. They nonetheless also raise the question 
about the capacity of public regulators to institutionalise and replicate these 
approaches in such a way that public risk management still meets other 
compelling imperatives for government action like the principles of legitimate 
expectations and legal certainty. The issue of precaution remains the ele-
phant in the room in this respect. Risk managers are hence invited to invest 
in continuous re-evaluations of the risks as a function of changing contexts 
– be the latter determined by advances in (scientific) knowledge, by changes 
in individual exposure to the risk or by re-definition of the underlying trade-
offs. In the case of drug authorisation processes, for instance, between the 
expectations and risk perceptions among patient groups on the one hand, 
and structural constraints by the public health care systems and the need 
for return in investment by industry on the other hand. There hence is a reit-
erated need to ground all risk management choices, no matter their nature, 
in robust, transparently and timely accessible evidence.
2. Revisiting risk regulation – Towards a roadmap
How can then regulatory action be improved on the basis of the practices 
currently in place? What follows are initial elements of a possible roadmap 
which urges public risk managers to work along four distinct yet intimately 
intertwined strands of action:
1. Creating and maintaining favourable framework conditions – Pub-
lic regulators need to deepen their understanding of, and facilitate, the 
competition–collaboration dynamics that characterise the interaction 
between stakeholders, with a view to create a positive ‘race to the top’ in 
terms of conceiving or implementing superior risk management solutions. 
Such solutions are superior if they prove their effectiveness but also their 
credibility and legitimacy.
 One way forward would be developing forms of participatory deci-
sion-making, exactly to reap the potential of stakeholder comparative 
advantages, to achieve early acceptance (if not consensus) and enhanced 
legitimacy by addressing and eventually internalising potential conflicts.
 This has impacts on the way public policies are designed – i.e. how strategi-
cally decision-makers link policy objectives across the various government 
interventions and how consistent and proportionate the instruments regu-
lators deploy are with respect to those objectives and the related impacts.
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 2. Using the best available and impartial (scientific) evidence – Recourse 
to the best evidence should be determined by the underlying scientific 
rigour, irrespective of its origin. Regulators must ensure that excellence 
and independence are the two key criteria to be applied when producing 
and using scientific advice.
 Excellence is achieved by sticking to the principles of the scientific method 
(replicability and verification of assumptions, methodologies and findings 
through internationally respected and validated standards); independence 
is essentially achieved by ensuring full transparency of interests and 
biases. Only this way can evidence of risk and harm be assessed and 
presented along with other legitimate factors that inform risk management 
decisions.
3. Better understanding the wider impacts of (regulatory) risk man-
agement decisions – Eventually, the effectiveness of harm prevention 
measures is assessed by each of us individually but public decision-mak-
ers must strike a balance between macro and micro consequences. 
Impacts of risk management decisions on innovation for instance, which 
is the single most powerful factor for economic growth in Western econo-
mies and on job creation, must be investigated alongside various aspects 
including public health, consumer welfare and the preservation of the 
environment.
 In practical terms, this calls for regulators to appropriately identify and 
measure societal benefits to gain from risk management options while 
at the same time grasping the indirect implications that their decisions 
may have for instance in terms of changes in capital allocation by private 
sector actors across an industry’s value chain (e.g. in relation to R&D 
investment patterns). Such changes induced by regulatory choices may 
significantly impact innovation, job creation, and subsequently societal 
prosperity.
 This strand of action also corroborates the need for making risk man-
agement as flexible as possible through timely integration of feedback 
from stakeholders and the affected actors and by allowing for scaling up 
of solutions and for continuous learning from new scientific or empirical 
insights.
4. Organising the communication of risks and risk management deci-
sions – This action does not mean monopolising risk communication. 
Rather, it refers to bridging domains as wide but necessary as the ones 
of scientists, regulators, decision-makers, stakeholders and laymen (the 
public), not least with respect to the notion of uncertainty and innovation, 
and the impossibility of managing everything and reducing risk down to 
zero.
 This takes the shape, for instance, of explaining that high quality harm 
management ensues from making decisions on the basis of risk (i.e. they 
should be proportionate to exposure, based on real world experience) as 
opposed to hazard.
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 When it comes to risk management, policy-makers must be fully aware of – 
and objectively communicate – what factors took priority in their decisions 
next to scientific evidence and why, and what are the consequences of 
those decisions onto society and the economy as a whole. Due process 
is required through the regulatory cycle, ensuring compliance with the 
principles of transparency, accountability, predictability and proportionality.
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